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Introduction

The African continent today is characterized by two major attributes: one is
fragmentation, and the other one is economic destitution. The concept of fragmentation
in Africa denotes a physical as well as an essential reality. Africa is not only the land of a
multitude of microstates, it is also a land where these geographical divisions have rifted
apart the hearts and minds of a people. Countries like Rwanda, Burundi, Lesotho,
Swaziland, Eritrea, Djibouti, and even Senegal, the Gambia etc. epitomize the sadness of
the African condition in their depiction of a land that seems incapable of uniting and
bring a solution its common problems. As for the concept of economic destitution, it
refers to millions of African living on less than a dollar a day. Most meaningfully it
refers to the millions of Africans who suffer from chronic malnutrition diseases. For
these reasons, the history of the young nations of Africa has always been pervaded by
two concepts: one is unity and the other one is development. The attainment of these two
objectives has become an African obsession. Yet, despite the different roads and a
myriad of plans, Africa seems to be going the other way. The artificial geopolitical
decoupage of Africa is coupled by a perverse internal fragmentation along linguistic,
cultural, ethnic, and historical lines. The cause being the consequence, poverty's favorite
home in the world has become Africa. One basic question that experts and non experts
alike have asked for a long time and are still asking rings like this: is Africa doomed?
While the majority seems to believe that there is a solution to Africa's problems, other
questions loom ahead and constitute a bumping block on Africa's way to a better future.
One such question is related to the appropriate approach to be adopted. There seems to
be no disagreement in principle among Africa's leadership on the need for a united Africa
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as the only way to development. Yet, to this day, Africa has not known any significant
form of union let alone development. What is the missing piece? What is Africa's
leadership doing, separate from public declarations, to set Africa on the salutary path of
unity and development?
Research Question
In this thesis, I intend to examine the role of African political leadership in the

quest for unity and development in Africa. Broadly speaking, leadership is often defined
as the position or office of a leader or the capacity to lead. Within the limits of this study,
leadership is evoked with the idea of individual leaders across the African continent. In
this respect, this study intends to submit to critical scrutiny a wide range of leaders going
from the period of the birth of most African nations in the 1960s to the latest attempt at
unity and development with the recent birth of the African Union. As for the concept of
unity, it refers to the need felt both by the elite and the masses for a united front in Africa.
This concept is expressed sometimes radically as in the case of the Casablanca group,
during the Addis Ababa conference, who advocated a union in the form of a federation of
all African states. At the head of this group was one man called Kwame Nkrumah. It is
also used to express the need for some degree of cooperation as exemplified by the
"moderates" of the Monrovia group who were anxious to protect their newly gained
sovereignty. As for the concept of development, it is a normative notion and obeys no
rule of universal definition. However, within the context of this thesis, it refers to the
idea of getting Africa out of poverty through increased economic efficiency and a
sustained level of integration.
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Justification

I chose the subject "Political Leadership and the Quest for Unity and
Development in Africa" for a variety of reasons. First of all, for Africa these two
concepts constitute overriding priorities. They do not constitute a luxury in themselves.
Rather they are sine qua non conditions that Africa is condemned to achieve if it wants to
remain a viable human entity. Second, if Africa is in the situation in which it is today, it
is to a large extent due to poor leadership. Third, I contend that the question of unity is
inseparable from the concept of development in the specific case of Africa. The thinness
of the markets of separate African countries, the political and social stability that
individual African countries seem incapable to guarantee are all ingredients that conspire
to send Africa into the back ladder of sustainable development. For this reason, a certain
type of African leadership has sought to establish some type of union within the
continent. These attempts go from the Organization of African Unity to the African
Union and a multitude of regional groupings, federations and confederations en passant.
That all these tentative efforts resulted in failure is a historical fact. African elites have
suffered an almost universal condemnation for the calamitous conditions of the continent.
Most of the previous literature on African Unity have argued that there is the potential for
an economic takeover if unity is achieved. The missing link, however, they argue is
Africa's leadership which is not up to the task (Diop 1987, Adewoye 2000). In this thesis
I focus on a closer assessment of the role of African leadership in the creation and
destruction of integration mechanisms in Africa. In other words, I intend to assess the
role of Africa's leadership in the building or weakening of African unity and
development.
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Certainly, If Africa looks like a "concentration camp" today, it is undoubtedly
because some historical forces conspired to tear Africa apart. The Berlin Conference
(1884-1885) which consecrated the balkanization of Africa with no respect to historical,
cultural, ethnic and linguistic realities, in this respect constitutes a founding event. Four
centuries of Atlantic slave trade, colonialism, and neocolonialism also took their
inexorable toll on Africa. But, it is also a sad truth that African elites failed the masses in
their initial promises during the first days of independence and are still failing them on to
this day. The "exogenous" factors to Africa's demise have been dealt with extensively.
Although these "exogenous" or historical factors are determinant in understanding the
present, new focus should be directed to endogenous factors in the sense that they will
determine what Africa is going to be. For all these fundamental reasons I intend to focus
on an assessment of the role of Africa's political leadership in the quest for unity and
development in Africa.

Research Method

This study intends to draw from previous research in the field of African politics
especially in its treatment of the related questions of leadership, unity and development.
This overall research has painted a grim picture of Africa's leadership as the primary
responsible for Africa's disunity and underdevelopment. Because of the new
developments that this study seeks to comprehend, data will also be collected from
newspaper articles, official, government statements, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) and the World Bank. I also intend to focus on a study of individual leaders and
individual regimes through the complexities of their interactions.
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In the first chapter I propose to review the conventional literature about African

political leadership and the literature about unity and development as well as the related
literature on regional organizations. In the second chapter I examine regional
organizations in Africa and their role in promoting Unity and economic integration in
Africa. At this level, I intend to focus on the case of the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS). The third chapter will discuss the creation of the New
Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). In the fourth chapter, I develop an
assessment of how the African Union (AU) was created to replace an ineffective and
moribund OAU. The fifth and final chapter will present the conclusion and findings of
this study.
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Chapter One
Literature Review

I. Leadership and the African Reality
a. Defining the concept of Leadership
Broadly, the concept of leadership refers to a reality as old as human and animal
organization (Rousseau 1762, Gordon 2002). It is generally defined as a process. In this
process, the individual (or leadership team) induces a group to pursue objectives held by
the leader and his or her followers (Gardner 1990). This definition of leadership
encompasses the idea and the concept of a necessity to perform basic tasks essential to
the survival of a group.
In the specific domain of politics, however, some classic references are testimony to the
fact that political leadership has been an important concern to political philosophers for
centuries. Plato, Niccolo Machiavelli, Max Weber, for instance, have all examined the
concept from different angles. Their conclusions, centuries ago, are still relevant and
illuminates the debate on political leadership. Plato's The Republic constitutes an attempt
to sketch the ideal state. In his ideal state, political leadership is vested in the
philosopher-king who leads with vision, and reason. He insists on an absolute rigor in the
process of selecting leaders. Intelligence and wisdom form one single entity and are
central to the Plato's view of leadership (Plato 360 BC). This normative approach to
leadership is contrasted by Machiavelli's prescriptive approach. Machiavelli's The
Prince is a how-to-rule manual. Most significantly, it is a cold set of prescriptions that
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the "prince" must follow if he wants to maintain power regardless of moral
considerations (Machiavelli 1513). These different approaches, although formulated
from a distant past, do indeed shed a light of understanding on contemporary African
politics where the quest for and preservation of power take an overriding priority over all
other agendas. As for Max Weber, his main argument on leadership is that great leaders
emerge in times of great distress. Africa is, without a doubt, at such a crossroad in her
history. He distinguishes three forms of leadership: charismatic leadership, traditional
leadership and administrative or bureaucratic leadership. Charisma is the gift from above
where a leader knows from inside himself what to do. This type of leadership contrasts
with the traditional leadership of a king or modem rational leadership of an
administrative or elected leader (Dronberger 1971). In the case of Africa in quest of an
elusive unity, Weber charismatic leader is most definitely needed.
Elcock's (2001) study of leadership constitutes a very interesting aspect of the
historical definition of the concept. He stresses the elusive nature of the definition of
leadership. His contribution to the literature is interesting in many ways. First, he
revisits the theories of Hegel (1822) and Thomas Carlyle (1841) who have argued that the
Great leaders emerge to change the course of history when they are needed. Second, he
brings out the literature that has attempted to draw a parallel between business and
political leadership. He argues that in business, or in the military, identifying potential
leaders is not impossible since the training in these domains is by and large uniform. In
politics, however, he argues that leaders are sui generis in the sense that they rise to
office through a myriad of accidents, which do not necessarily reflect their ability to lead.
He cites Adolph Hitler and Joseph Stalin as prime examples of leaders who came to
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power because of mere historical contingencies. Elcock goes from this historical
perspective to highlight the vitality of leadership in today in the context of fast paced
changes at all levels of society.

b. The African Perspective
In the African context, the concept of leadership does not differ fundamentally

from the previous classical approaches. However, the unique circumstances in Africa do
indeed call for an examination of the concepts through "new lenses". Defining the
concept of leadership, the Nigerian senator Okadigbo wrote: "I use the word leadership to
mean those who are in charge of government, those who have the power to allocate
resources authoritatively according to certain conditions (Okadigbo 1995). Iosokun
(1998), on the hand, runs counter to Okadigbo in his argument that leadership is not
necessarily a question of position or authority in the sense that a man without charisma
(Weber) and even without competence may find himself in a position of leadership.
Under the light of the peculiar circumstances of Africa made of disintegration and
destitution, one could legitimately ask the question whether it is all about the African
condition, one of doom; or is it about the leadership? In other words, do leaders matter?
Samuels (2003), in his analysis of leadership, argues that leadership is the determining
factor in shaping history and that historical forces are only secondary to their talents and
will. "In short", says Samuels, "constraints may be greater in the historian's narrative
than they are in the real world, where social, political, and economic forces can be tipped
into the balance to abet the leader's scheme. (Samuels 2003, 2) This view is shared by
analysts and political leaders alike on the African continent. Wade (1989) argues that in
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the case of Africa, it is true that natural calamities and historical injustices bear their
share of responsibilities in the demise of Africa. But he recognizes also is it also true that
Africa's leadership, through it absence of concerted and united programs, is a major
source of disillusionment for the African people. Obasango (1990), in his preface to
Challenges of Leadership in African Development stresses the paramount importance of
the role that African leaders must play within the framework of a genuine cooperation
mechanism. He presses for the need for African leaders to become the architects of
Africa's own fortune since so far Africa's leadership has for the most part only brought
disaster to millions of Africans. For him, Africa's salvation lies within the own hands of
Africans via their leadership. For this reason and because of the centrality of informed
leadership in the process of political and economic integration, in his eyes, he established
the African Leadership Forum with the mission of fostering genuine leadership in Africa.
Most importantly, he stresses one of the major objectives of the forum:
"To generate greater understanding and to enhance the knowledge and
awareness of development and social problems within a global context
among young, potential leaders from all sectors of society, cutting
across national, regional, continental, professional, and institutional
borders and with a view to fostering close and enduring relationships
and promoting life-long association and cooperation among such
potential leaders". (Obasango, 1990, 6-7)

Gordon (2002) provides additional support for this view. In his review of the
African condition through some basic indicators such as health, education, food, housing,
road conditions, corruption, etc., he arrives at the conclusion that the determining factor
in Africa's problems is a failing leadership.

"If all the money in the world is given to

Africa today," he argues, "it will be worthless in the long-run without effective and
creative leadership." (Gordon 2002, 174). In the eyes of most of analysts, Africa's
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leadership is clearly not just a leadership that failed in its attempts to promote political,
economic, and social development, but a leadership which failed to set up the basic
infrastructures for a genuine united Africa. Gordon notes that the creation of the
Organization of African Unity (OAU), for instance, culminated a long battle among
African leaders on the idea of African unity, Pan-Africanism, and regionalism. In this
respect, the "death" of the OAU in July 2002 constitutes a cruel testimony to the sterility
of a preposterous leadership battle that has characterized Africa in various forms and
fashions from the 1960s to this day. This type of leadership characterized by
sectarianism, ethnocentrism and their corollaries has caused a permanent state of conflict
(active or latent) throughout the African continent. The politics of ethnocentrism and
division by Africa's leadership has also been examined by Ayittey (1998). The author
condemns Africa's leadership for this blatant failure. However, he makes a clear
differentiation between the leadership in Africa and the people. Africa's disintegration
and demise, for him, is the direct result of poor leadership. The second distinction and
the most important one in his eyes, concerns what he calls the 'two Africas": the
traditional Africa and the modem one. He contends that the traditional face of Africa is
the one that works with efficiency, the one that produces to sustain its people. In
contrast, the "modem Africa", the lost one, is the Africa of political greed which causes
disruptions and dislocations. It is the Africa that claims countless innocent victims as
illustrated by the Rwandan genocide and the senseless human carnage in other areas of
Africa. He argues that "Most African leaders are despots and failures" and are true
representations of modem Africa (Ayittey 1998, 13). Similar views are expressed by
Konneh (2002) who contrasts pre-colonial African political leadership to post-colonial
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African leadership. He argues that, prior to the advent the colonial system, the style of
leadership in Africa was one of "communalism", a system in which the individual was
nothing apart from the group. In neo-colonial Africa, however, African leaders became
wealthy through the use of the inherited colonial strategies and tactics of duplicity and
extortion to enrich themselves at the expense of the masses. These views have been
supported by the latest literature on African leadership. Mpangala (2000, 117) argues that
recent "studies on ethnic conflicts in Africa have revealed that most African politicians
have been at the center of conflicts due to the fact that political competition and
competition for economic privileges have often been based on ethnic relations, thus
exacerbating ethnic conflicts."
If one thing is clear at the light of these analyses, it is the fact that the real trouble

with Africa is its leadership. Such seems to be the conclusions of Adewoye. "Africa's
crisis" he lashes out, "lies mainly in the political domain, in the 'structural' sector from
where poor or bad leadership often reflects adversely in all other sectors and facets of the
political system and society." (Adewoye 2000, 39) For this reason, he sides with Ben
Turok (1991) who had previously argued that the solution to Africa's crisis lies not so
much in the economic as in the political domain.
If the authors above examined the situation on the continental scale, others started

with the smaller unit by analyzing the state of the African nation-state. Cervenka in 1977
had this remark: "So far the priority of national interest over those of Africa as a whole
has been the main African weakness both in the relations between independent African
States and in their relations with the industrialized countries." (Cervenka 1977) The
author argues the real problem with Africa is the problem of a leadership that clings in a
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morbid fashion to the concept of national sovereignty to the detriment of unity on a
continental scale. This view is echoed by Bakut (2000). He is primarily interested in
examining the question under the angle of the tiny unit of the state, which in his view has
become somewhat out of phase as a political unit. He argues that while the New World
Order has increasingly brought into question the relevance of the state system in the
developed world, African governments fail to see the "writings on the wall". These
governments, he maintains, are still holding on tightly to the obsolescent state system
even though it is quite clear that it has failed in Africa. Bakut proposes a classic
functionalist approach to integration in Africa. Previous attempts failed, he argues,
because they were Eurocentric approaches to a different reality. For him the African
reality, one of severe underdevelopment and one in which the concepts of tribal and
ethnic loyalties override that of state loyalties, makes it impossible for any state-centered
approaches to work. Abounding in the same direction and expanding on the remarks,
Muchie contends that the key constraint to African integration is political. For the dual
system to work, he argues, it requires an African consensus and the political will to create
an African general will. This can happen if African leadership transforms itself from
governing by force, deception and blackmail to governing by permanent consent. The
key is the transformation of the quality of leadership -- to become and be guided by moral
and intellectual power (Muchie 2002). In this thesis, I use the concept of good leadership
to refer to a leadership that is willing to sacrifice political and personal gains for the
greater good of Africa. It refers to a type of leadership that does what is takes so that the
union may be saved.
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These preceding lines show that Africa's leadership has played a key role in the
disintegration and demise of Africa. However, one is forced to admit that other variables
have played their part. The transatlantic slave trade and the colonial era have left Africa
a legacy that has destined the black continent for internal division and underdevelopment
(Rodney 1981). The Berlin conference of 1884, which drew Africa's current borders
with a total disregard for African realties, is the key factor to the "balkanization" of
Africa. However, this balkanization lived on because Africa's leadership has allowed it
to live on.

II. The Concept of Unity: an African Obsession
As for the question of continental unity, it would hardly be exaggerated to state that it has
been an African obsession from the 1960s to this day. Yet, the approach to unity has
been a source of opposing views. There is a general agreement among scholars and
politicians that African unity in whatever form or shape is a question of necessity.
Nyerere, the first president of Tanzania contends that "Africa's states are too many, too
small, some make no logic, whether political logic or ethnic logic or anything." (Nyerere
2000, 20). Nkrumah, the first president of Ghana, argued that Africa's leadership had the
responsibility to rally behind the cause of unity in the context of the newly independent
nations of Africa if they were to win the battle of development and maintain their
independence. "To go it alone', lamented Nkrumah, "will limit our horizons, curtail our
expectations, and threaten our liberty (Nkrumah 1963, 7). For him it became increasingly
clear that nothing sort of a continental government, a continental army and a continental
economic system would save Africa. As for the opposing side, independence meant the
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preservation of the "national sovereignties" that the end of colonial rule had bequeathed
them. For this reason, they perceived the very idea of a "united continental government"
as a major threat to something they spent their lives fighting for.
The bulk of the existing literature on this question is mainly focused on the main
organization that was charged with the responsibility of promoting unity in Africa: the
Organization of African Unity. Because the OAU was mainly concerned with the total
liberation of the African continent from the yoke of colonialism, this literature has given
a special focus to the militant aspect of unity in Africa. In other words this literature
relates the prevailing climate in which, the newly independent African nations sensed the
urgency to cooperate in order to rid Africa of domination but at the same time the
necessity to preserve the colonial borders of the continent (Cervenka 1977, Gordon
2002). With the end of colonialism and the fall of the Berlin wall, however, questions of
economic and developmental nature have surfaced and become Africa's top priority. The
death of the OAU and its subsequent replacement with the African Union in July 2002
could be understood under this light. It is the tragic expression of an Africa in search for
the magic potion to unity one way or the other. Remarks from observers of the African
scene are similar in their recognition of the need for Africa to tilt the balance in favor of a
united front. The political balkanization of Africa into arbitrary nation-states, it is often
argued, elicits from Africa the understandable impulse to restructure the fragmented
region into a more coherent and stronger economic and political entity (Economic
Commission for Africa 1989). Adedeji (1991, 12) contends that "[n]o African country,
no matter how big it is, can really go it alone in the world we are entering in the 1990s.
The economic integration of Africa is part of the solution to the crisis of Africa". The
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same idea on the need for a genuine form of union is recognized today by President
Yoweri Museveni of Uganda who contends that the way forward for Africa is the
establishment of a single continental government and army. He adds as an avow of a
failing leadership throughout the black continent: "I am afraid that we are making the
same mistakes as our forefathers made, failing to evolve a strong political unit that can
guarantee the security of future generations" (cited in Mwakikagile 2001).
Griffiths (1995) abounds in the same direction in his support for Nkrumah's
contention that a political union in Africa is a must. But he also recognizes that for any
form of union (political or economic) to work, all the parties must be willing to be part of
the union. For him, the Ethiopian experience with Eritrea and the Moroccan experience
with Western Sahara constitute convincing illustrations to the fact that parties can not be
forced into some type of union. These coercive measures to bond together clearly bear of
an obsessive quest for unity in Africa. Clearly, what could be called Africa's new
leadership had this concept in mind when they were setting up the New Partnership for
Africa's Development. They had the same idea in mind when the delivered the African
Union. Thus Mbeki, Obasanjo, Bouteflika and Wade, by presenting the world with an
authentic plan, through NEPAD, to move Africa towards the direction of unity and
development, are attempting to operate a decisive and historic break. These leaders have
exposed their determination to give African politics a new meaning. Muammar Khaddafi
in spearheading the creation of the African Union is sending a message of survival of the
proponents of genuine unity in Africa. The quest for unity is also expressed through the
creation of the many regional and sub-regional organizations in Africa like the South
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African Development Community, and the Economic Community of West African
States.

III. Africa's Leadership and the Inability to Unite
Africa, it is generally argued is the land of despair and disunity, not because of the
character of its people but because of the betrayal of its leadership. As suggested earlier,
the general literature argues that the main obstacle to Africa's unity and development is
its political leadership, which has displayed a regular pattern of inability to work together
within the framework of a united front (Killick 1993, Hope 1997). Hope (1997, xii)
points to the heart of the matter. "It is undisputed" he maintains, "that Africa needs to
develop a new shared vision of regional cooperation and integration. Improving policies
alone can boost growth substantially, but if neighboring countries adopt a policy change
together, the effects on growth would be more than double what they would be with one
country acting alone." He further argues that Africa' leaders have to show a genuine
willingness to work together but also to disengage from authoritarianism, to dismantle the
bureaucratic obstacles to policy reform and change. Ihonvbere (2000) argues that
ideological differences, nationalistic interests, the inability to generate sufficient political
will, corruption, regime turnover, and political instability constitutes some determinant
variables limiting the ability to implement the various charters and cooperation
agreements. With his usual literary eloquence and clarity, The Nigerian writer, Achebe's
remarked that: "[T]he trouble with Nigeria is simply and squarely a failure of leadership. There is
nothing basically wrong with the Nigerian character. There is nothing wrong with the Nigerian land or
climate or water or air or anything else. The Nigerian problem is the unwillingness or inability of its
leaders to rise to the responsibility, to the challenge of personal example which are the hallmarks of true
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leadership." (Achebe 1985, 3) This remark, beyond the case Nigeria, is applicable to

Africa at large.
Davidson's (1992) remark on the other hand goes from inside out. His main
focus is on the state level in order to determine the conditions under which a larger scale
system of unity. In his analysis of African leadership through the Liberian crisis, he
remarks that it has not been a constructive one. Rather, this type of leadership has proved
to be even incapable of maintaining the unity of the nation-state. He cites the pile of
examples like Samuel Doe of Liberia, Mobutu Seseko of former Zaire, Idi Amin of
Uganda, Jean B. Bokassa of the Central African Republic. These names represent what
Kobina sekyi called cultural hybrids who lacked the basic knowledge and clarity of
vision to be agents of unity throughout Africa.
The basic inability of Africa's leadership to bring about a genuine united front
through the Organization of African Unity explains the pressing need to transform the
OAU especially in its principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member
states (Mwakikagile 2001). This principle has only served as a pretext for African
leaders to ossify the balkanization of Africa and hold a firmer grip on their pieces of
territory to the detriment of the common good of the African people. For this reason,
some of its most virulent critics have argued that the OAU was more preoccupied with
integrating the leaders of Africa in their common search to secure their kleptocratic
powers than with the integration of the African people. Expressions like "cartel" of
"OAU gangsterism", "mutual admiration club for leaders, "trade union of African
leaders" and similar metaphors abounded in daily newspapers and tracts to capture the

19

failure of the OAU to embrace the aspirations of the African masses (Walraven 1999,
313).
A major question, however, is what are the prerequisites for unity schemes to
function in general and in Africa in particular? In other words does the concept require
intangibles in order to be effective. Deng and Zartman (2002), in their analysis of
regimes, argue that the leadership of the countries in question is the determinant factor to
the success of such an endeavor. Most fundamentally, these authors insist on the
existence a regional hegemon and its role in establishing and maintaining a regime of
cooperation for security, stability, and development. In the case of Africa, they point to
Nigeria who because of its economic potential could play a locomotive role in the unity
and development of Africa. In the case of Africa, the potential is available, but the
missing link is leadership, direction and the mobilization of that potential to the greater
benefit of the African people.

IV. Summary of the Literature Review
The literature on the relationship between African leadership and the concepts of
unity and development is quite extensive. There is a quasi unanimity among the
specialists of African politics that there exists a correlation between poor leadership and
Africa's absence of unity and its problems. Most importantly, the creation of the first
unity scheme (the OAU) has not meant greater unity for Africa (Cervenka 1977,
Walraven 1999, Gordon 2002). However, this literature calls for a reexamination with
the creation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in June 2002
and the African Union (AU) in July of the same year. These two organizations are
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creations of "Africa's new leadership" and are aimed at giving a fundamentally different
meaning to the concept of unity in Africa. Because of the novelty of these developments
in Africa (the creation of NEPAD and the AU), my research aims at reexamining Africa's
Leadership. I will also examine a typical regional organization, ECOWAS, in order to
broaden the scope of this thesis. In these choices, I am primarily interested in diversity.
ECOWAS, because its represents a major regional organization and is representative of
the functioning of regional integration schemes in Africa. NEPAD, because as a creation
of four major Africa democratically elected leaders (Mbeki, Obasanjo, Bouteflika, and
Wade) it constitutes an integration scheme under the democratic angle. As for the
African Union, it constitutes a premier in the history of Africa both in its nature and
scope. First, it is an African creation meant for Africa. Second, and most importantly, as
an organization regrouping the entirety of the African countries from its beginning, the
AU constitutes an interesting testing creation.
However diverse the authors studied may seem in their approach, their observations share
a common trait. They all recognize the African dilemma: an absence of a continental
leadership and the need for a continental scheme. This research aims at examining the
role of African political leadership in the integration of African states through the
creation of ECOWAS, NEPAD and the AU. In chapter three, I intend to focus on an
extended analysis of ECOWAS using macro-economic variables. In chapter three and
four I will respectively analyze the New Partnership for Africa's Development and the
African Union as original creations of Africa's leadership. Chapter five will sum up the
ideas developed throughout the thesis.
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Chapter 2
Political Leadership and the Politics of Regional Unity in Africa: The case of
ECOWAS

The quest for unity and development in Africa has brought the African leadership to
advance a myriad of plans designed to create a united front in Africa. This quest explains
the creation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). The
creation of ECOWAS has to be placed within the broader context of regional groupings
that shaped the world in the post World War II era. Different countries have sought to
establish special ties with their geographical neighbors. This quest has resulted in the
creation of the European Union (EU) in Europe, the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) between the US, Canada and Mexico and the Association of South
East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in South East Asia among others. In the case of Africa,
ECOWAS is one of the major the regional organizations along with the South African
Development Community, and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA). The vision that the founding fathers had at the time of the creation of
ECOWAS was one of collective self-sufficiency through the integration of the sixteen
West African countries. This concern was born out of the realization that the domestic
markets of the member States taken individually were, as a result of their smallness, far
from being competitive in a world environment marked by the existence of large trade
blocks (ECOWAS Website).
In this chapter, I propose to focus on the creation of Economic Community of
West African States. ECOWAS was created in 1975 and is a regional group of sixteen
countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote D'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea,
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Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and
Togo. The aims and objectives of ECOWAS are defined in article 3 of its treaty. It reads
as follow: "The aims of the Community are to promote co-operation and integration,
leading to the establishment of an economic union in West Africa in order to raise the
living standards of its peoples, and to maintain and enhance economic stability." To
achieve this goal, ECOWAS proposes the "establishment of a common market." This
chapter seeks to assess the role of Africa's leadership in the building or weakening of
African unity through ECOWAS.
The idea of a West African community goes back to President William Tubman
of Liberia who made the first call in 1964. In April 1972, General Yakubu Gowon of
Nigeria and General Gnassimbe Eyadema of Togo re-launched the idea and toured 12
West African countries for support. A first meeting was organized in Lome, Togo in
December 1973 to study the draft of the treaty. This meeting was followed by the Accra
(Ghana) meeting of January 1974. This eventually paid off with the signing of the treaty
establishing ECOWAS on May 28, 1975 in Lagos, Nigeria. The role of the states of
West Africa, through their heads of states is central in the creation of ECOWAS.
However, other non-states actors took some part in making possible the creation of the
regional organization. Oloruntimehin (2000) contends that the Federation of West
African Chambers of Commerce (FWACC) has had a decisive impact on the creation of
ECOWAS. For him, the prominent leadership of the federation has put it in a position
where its members could exercise influence on the government in their respective
countries. Yet despite this fact concludes Oloruntimehin, ECOWAS has been rigidly
built around the leadership of state actors. This, in his view, is largely imputable to the
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tendencies of political leaders in West Africa to political and economic restrictions. In
Sum, the founders fathers of ECOWAS sought to create the framework that would allow
a fluid trade flow between members countries of the organization by eliminating customs
duties, abolishing quantitative and administrative restrictions on trade among the
members states, by establishing common customs tariff and a common commercial
policy toward third countries, abolishing the obstacles to the free movement of persons,
services and capital (Senghor 1999). These are the defining principles of the founding of
ECOWAS.
But what do the concepts used in this chapter refer to? What exactly does the
concept of "West African States" refer to? Where is its geopolitical delimitation? What
are the conditions to being part of West Africa? The concept, in itself constitutes a
geopolitical arbitrariness (Ajulo 1985). In this chapter, I intend to consider the sixteen
West African Countries that signed the treaty that established ECOWAS.
What is understood by economic and political integration? I decided to examine
the twin questions of economic and political integration because, in the context of West
Africa, the two variables are inextricably linked. Any economic policy, in order to be
viable, must have the support of the political leadership in the different countries of the
community. This political leadership must create not only the legal conditions to serve as
a framework, but it must also ensure the security base, which is a sine qua non condition
for any economic integration, is in place. This explains largely the place of the
ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), the de facto military wing of ECOWAS. The
ECOMOG is a non-standing military force that was set up by member states of the
community to deal with the security problems that followed the collapse of the state in
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Liberia in 1990. Since then, it has been called upon to deal with a variety of conflicts in
West Africa. I intend to examine ECOWAS' attitude toward the four major conflicts
within Africa and try to measure its impact. Most fundamentally, I intend to examine
how Africa's leadership in the western part of Africa has used ECOMOG to promote an
integrated regional security mechanism and what are the effects of that use. The reason
for this is that an integrated West Africa is inextricably to an integrated security
mechanism within the region.
This issue is both timely and crucial. As Africa is still searching for a true
formula through which she could pose a firmly united front, a study of her earliest
attempts to promote regional groupings is fundamental if she is to learn from these
experiences. With the creation of the African Union in July 2002, scholars and
politicians alike bring to surface the relevance of regional organizations in Africa.
ECOW AS is among the first in line. Africa cannot afford to do without constantly
evaluating and reevaluating the successes of her regional organizations. This paper
intends to revisit previous assumptions taking into account new data available from
various sources.
But first, I intend to examine the macro-economic variable. In order to
operationalize this variable, I will focus on the trade flow among member countries of the
Community.

I. The Disintegration of West African Markets
To examine the variable of trade and its effects within the ECOW AS, I focus on
three member countries of the community: Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Senegal. I have
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chosen these three countries for many reasons. My first concern is one of fairness and
balance. Nigeria and Sierra Leone constitute two extremes of African economies.
Nigeria represents wealth in West Africa, whereas Sierra Leone symbolizes political and
economic collapse. As for Senegal, the country is somewhere in between in the sense
that she enjoys a relative political stability, yet is not the best of West Africa's
economies.
I gathered the material for these three different countries through the country
profile index from the web site of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World
Bank. I first start with Senegal. I am primarily interested in the trade variable. Table I,
which displays Senegal's main export partners, shows that only four members of
ECOWAS (Mauritania, Mali, Cote d'Ivoire, The Gambia) figure in the "top eleven" list.
In this list, France, Senegal's former colonial master, represents $165 million in exports,
whereas, Mauritania and Mali, the closest ECOWAS member represents only $49 million
each. Furthermore, when the share of export of these four members of ECOWAS is
added together, it does not even make up for France's share alone.
As far as import is concerned, Table II does not reveal any integration evidence
between Senegal and the other members of the Community. France is the top import
partner and its share largely surpasses any other country's share. In addition, except for
Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire, no other member of the Community figures in the table. One
could even argue that Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire are Senegal's partners not through
ECOWAS, but because of their status as the leading economies in West Africa in 2002.
As such, their deals are negotiated on a bilateral basis. These data do not take into
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account the recent developments that evolved in a civil war in Cote d'Ivoire and is likely
even to get Cote d'Ivoire out of the table.
One would naturally expect that with the creation of ECOWAS, the trade flow
within the member countries would exceed those of the trade flow between ECOWAS
and non-members. The trade statistics, both in table I and table II, show that in the year
2000, twenty-five years after the creation of ECOWAS, the three first major export
destinations of Senegal are not members of ECOWAS (e.g. France, Italy, and India) and
except for one country (Nigeria, the leading economy of West Africa), none of Senegal's
major sources of imports is a member of the Community.
A comparison to Nigeria's trade index, another major member of ECOWAS,
reveals an even more disintegrated image of the Community. The statistics in Table ill,
which depicts Nigeria's import partners, show that none of Nigeria's top 10 markets is
part of the ECOWAS zone. The United Kingdom, Nigeria's former colonial master, is at
the top of the list. And for that matter, no African country is part of the list.
Sierra Leone is no exception to the general rule. With no member of ECOWAS
on in its top ten-export partner list, Sierra Leone symbolizes the failure of ECOWAS to
promote trade among the members of the Community. The only surprise, Table IV
(Sierra Leone's export partners) provides, is that the UK ranks only third in position with
a share far below that of Belgium, Sierra Leone's top export partner.
As for Table V (Sierra Leone's import partners), it shows that with only two
ECOWAS members (Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria) on its top ten imports partner list and no
ECOWAS members as a major import partner, Sierra Leone exemplifies an absence of
trade integration in West Africa. As in the case of Senegal and Nigeria, the former
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colonial power of Sierra Leone, the UK is on top of the list with a share that exceeds by
far any other country's share.
What these cases from three representative members of the ECOWAS reveal is an
absence of integration in the trade variable within West Africa. The three countries
examined (Senegal, Nigeria and Sierra Leone) share a common characteristic: their main
area of business is outside the scope of ECOWAS. These findings are consistent with
previous studies on trade within West Africa. David J. Francis contended that the export
of African countries is directed mainly to the industrial countries of the West, and some
to Asia. Industrial countries and Asia, he maintains make up about 80 per cent of the
continent's GDP (Francis 2001). This remark holds true for the member states of the
ECOWAS. Compared to the East African Region, one may conclude with Oloruntimehin
(2000) that ECOWAS has had very little by way of achievement. The reason for the
comparison is that as the second largest regional bloc in Africa (thirteen members), East
Africa could be an interesting area to compare to West Africa in terms of GDP. I
collected data for these individual countries of East Africa from the same source and the
same date as the GDP data on ECOWAS. Then I drew a comparative table (table VI). I
calculated the average GDP of East African states through the same procedure that I used
to calculate the average GDP ofECOWAS. The result for East Africa is $1,111. When
this GDP is compared to that of ECOWAS ($353), the difference is telling. This East
African Economic Community is under the leadership of the core states of Tanzania,
Kenya and Uganda.

II. Africa's Leadership: a factor of regional integration or disintegration
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An equally determining factor to be considered is the security variable. Has West
African leadership, through the creation of ECOWAS and the ECOMOG (ECOWAS'
peacekeeping force) made the concept of collective security a reality for the region? Or
more broadly, has the ECOWAS brought the countries of West Africa closer in terms of
their approach to security?
Analyzing the violent stir in West African states in general beginning in 1991,
Zartman differentiates two cases. In the first case composed of Mali, Guinea-Bissau,
Niger, Ivory Coast, and Nigeria, military coups succeed military coups but by and large
the population is not seriously endangered. Second, in the cases of Liberia and Sierra
Leone, however, civil wars caused enormous damage on the population, with a third of
Liberia's population displaced and as many as 250,000 killed and half of the 5 million
Sierra Leoneans displaced and 100,000 killed during the decade. (Zartman and Deng
2002) Within the framework of this study, I intend to focus on the Liberian case for two
main reasons. The first one is that the Liberian conflict constitutes a founding event in
the history of ECOWAS and the second is the regional meaning of the conflict in
question and its economic and political implications. The Liberian crisis has ushered
ECOWAS into a new era. ECOWAS was created to promote economic integration in
West Africa. But as the war in Liberia threatened the stability of the region as a whole,
ECOWAS was called upon to constitute a security branch for the region through the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) Monitoring Group
(ECOMOG). Article 4 of the ECOWAS Charter provides for collective security if a
member state is threatened by internal armed conflict that is supported by an external
entity which threatens the peace and security of the region. However ECOMOG has
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largely failed due mainly to internal divisions based on differences between states'
"national" and "leadership" interests in the region." (Kalu 1995) It appears from this
point that leadership is a stumbling block, not a building block from the integration
perspective. In the case of Liberia, there is a virtual consensus among the analysts that
ECOWAS' intervention in Liberia was a fiasco. Adibe notes the beleaguered attempt by
Liberia's neighbors, acting under the aegis of the Economic Community of West African
States (ECOWAS), to prevent the regional spread of the conflict through direct political
and military intervention. (Adibe 1997). However, Francis provides one explanation. He
contends that the decision of ECOW AS to intervene in the Liberia was depicted by
Francophone West African states leaders as a move by the Anglophone section of the
organization (Francis 2001). In a gesture of retaliation, and for personal motivations and
interests, Blaise Compaore of Burkina Faso and Houphouet Boigny Cote d'lviore (both
French speaking countries and members of ECOWAS) supported CharlesTaylor, the
opposite party in the war. At this level, the theory of political institutionalism does not
hold since membership in the ECOW AS did not alter state behavior. The Liberian case,
more than anything else, proves the legitimacy of the political realist theory. States, on
both sides intervened primarily to secure the survival of their own regimes.
This perennial Anglophone/Francophne rivalry was thus manifest in the
ECOMOG and undermined the capacity to secure peace in Liberia. Ecowas peacekinng
force consisted mainly of troops from four Anglophone West African states and one
Francophone State, Guinea, which has historically been the outcast of the Francophone
group. Kieh gives a sense of the existing tension between these two blocs. Gnassimbe
Eyadema of Togo, he argues, withdrew his offer as a manifestation of his loyalty to la
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Francophonie. Burkina Faso has vehemently opposed the peacekeeping efforts.
Senegal has consistently cast doubt on ECOW AS ability to handle the Liberian problem.
And Ivorian president Houphouet Boigny, the doyen of the Francophone group, called a
meeting of ECOWAS heads of state in late 1990, in contravention of the organization's
charter. (Kieh 1994)
This argument is supported by Zartman who contends that President Ibrahim Babangida
of Nigeria, a personal friend of Doe, sent the ECOMOG to rescue Doe and end a war that
was launched from Ivory Coast and supported by Burkina Faso and, more distantly,
Libya of Muammar Khaddafi (Zartman and Deng 2002).
However, the declaration of moratorium for three years on the importation,
exportation, and manufacture of light weapons signed by the sixteen members of
ECOWAS on October 31, 1998 in Abuja, Nigeria shed a light of hope in the region
(Murray 2000). Nevertheless, in the light of the recent developments in Cote d'Ivoire,
which has always been a model in West Africa, and the incapacity of ECOWAS to come
with a viable formula, this hope has been shattered.
In addition to this political rivalry, Kieh argues that the Francophone states,
despite their membership in ECOWAS, formed a rival economic organization,

Communaute Economic de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO). This organization opposes,
among other things, ECOWAS trade liberalization efforts and duplicates its
compensation fund for trade deflation. (Kieh 1994)
Most dramatically, instead of providing West Africa with a homogenous political
leadership, ECOWAS seems to have provided West African leaders only the option to
side with either the Anglophone camp or the Francophone camp of the organization.
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Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau, Cote D'Ivoire and the state of quasi-permanent
political violence with the rest of West African States constitutes a failing grade for
ECOWAS in terms of regional security.
The last point that this chapter addresses is the issue of population flow within
West Africa. The objective here is to examine the impact of ECOWAS on migration
movements within West Africa since the concept of free movement is closely related to
the idea of unity among West African countries. A protocol was signed in 1979 by the 16
members of ECOWAS relating to the free circulation of the region's citizens and to rights
of residence and establishment. The first provision (the right of entry without a visa)
came into force in 1980 following ratification by eight numbers. The second provision,
allowing unlimited rights of residence, was signed in 1986 although by mid-1997 only
one country had ratified the protocol on rights of residence. Articles 2 (2d) and 27 (1,2)
of ECOWAS Treaty stress the need to maintain, if not encourage, intra-regional
movements of persons as a way of rationalizing and optimizing resource use within the
scope of West African states. For this purpose, the Protocol designed a clear process that
would operate in a three-step fashion:
Phase 1-Right of Entry and Abolition of Visa- 1980-1985
Phase 2 - Right of Residence - 1985-1990
Phase 3 -Right of establishment- 1990-1995.
One could legitimately formulate some reservations on this subject however.
First, these statistics account poorly for the bulk of population movements, which took
place outside the official scope of ECOWAS Treaty and Protocol. Because of the porous
nature of borders in West Africa, unofficial movements of persons as well as goods are
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not accounted for properly. The unofficial migratory flow of persons and goods between
Senegal and The Gambia, for instance, may exceed what the statistics of official
statements report. This is all the more correct since statistics in West Africa and Africa
in general, as one Senegalese sociologist put it, are like a bikini: they only hide the most
essential parts, leaving off the bulk of the material relevant to the study. The second
argument is related to the implementation of these paper agreements. In practice, these
agreements on free movement have not been implemented in West Africa. The numerous
checkpoints that are still effective in virtually all ECOWAS countries, the administrative
harassment and extortion that ECOWAS citizens are subjected to in the major ECOWAS
member countries are clear signs of violations of these agreements. Meyers argues that
Nigeria, for instance, deported over two million immigrants in 1983 and 1985 and Cote
d'Ivoire pressured ten of thousands of immigrants from Burkina Faso to leave the country
in 1999 and 2001 (Meyers 2002). When the jobs of the "natives" are threatened, political
leaders usually resort to these methods as a means to regain popular support. Thus the
capacity of the host country to absorb the flux of immigrants constitutes a determining
factor in the population flow within West African since some especial countries, like
Nigeria and Cote d'Ivoire, are the targets. The civil war in Cote d'Ivoire was a direct
result of this confrontation between the Ivoirian authorities and those they considered
non-ivoirians. However, it is outside the scope of this chapter to make judgments as to
the moral or legal basis of these practices that lead to an interruption of the social,
political, and economic peace in the region. The evidence simply supports that
ECOWAS has not promoted free population movement in West Africa.
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III. Conclusion
Does the integration of West African states depend on ECOWAS' leadership?
The evidence examined does not establish any relationship between the independent
variable (ECOWAS' leadership) and the dependent variable (integration). The trade
variable examined for three countries of the ECOWAS (Nigeria, Sierra Leone and
Senegal) shows that in all the three cases, the major trading partners are outside the scope
ofECOWAS.
There is no doubt, however that these figures have to be taken with maximum
care. Statistics in the case of Africa in general do not necessarily reflect the absolute
reality. The black market is usually poorly accounted for. The import I export data
between Senegal and the Gambia, for instance, is certainly much different from the
official statistics. The same is true for human transit from one country to another within
the region. These population movements, in the case of West Africa, are not always
documented. Khobe argues that internal official trade between member states is low due
to poor interstate infrastructures (particularly road, railway and telecommunications);
different colonial histories and heritages; and deep-seated distrust between the ruling
elite. He also argues that informal crossborder trade and population movements are
quite widespread (Khobe 2000)
On the other hand, the goal of a monetary union in ECOWAS has long been an
objective of the organization, going back to its formation in 1975, and is intended to
accompany a broader integration process that would include enhanced regional trade and
common in,stitutions (Masson and Pattillo 2001). Unfortunately, this objective has not
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been achieved. Muchie argues that money and financial flows still occur between Africa
and the West rather than within Africa itself (Muchie 2003). This remark holds true in
the case of West Africa. The trade flow in the three cases examined (Nigeria, Sierra
Leone and Senegal) supports Muchie's argument. This gradualist approach to integration
has also been questioned for the very same reasons (lrele 1990). The concept of
gradualism or of union through concentric circles can pose a serious problem because in
the absence of institutions, political will gets substituted to political whim. Thus these
concentric circles are created in one day and foregone the next day. The Mali federation
with Mali and Senegal and the Senegambian confederation with Senegal and The
Gambia, for instance, were thrown in the dustbin of history mainly because they were not
institutionalized. For one thing, political realism in West Africa is much alive today than
ever before. Instead of fundamentally altering state behavior, ECOWAS has become a
tool in the hands of some West African countries in pursuit of their own national agendas.
Has the creation of ECOWAS positively altered the security variable in West
Africa? The answer to this question seems to be negative. Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea
Bissau, Cote d'Ivoire are the extreme cases of ECOWAS' failure to positively impact on
security in West Africa. These extreme cases hide less extreme forms of violence, social
and political disorders in various pockets of West Africa including in Senegal
(Casamance) and Nigeria (ethnic and religious violence). Francis' argument should be
put within such a context. Twenty-five years after the creation of ECOWAS, he echoes
the words of a renowned expert. West Africa, he says, has been pessimistically portrayed
by analysts such as Robert Kaplan as the new "strategic danger" in contemporary world
politics because of the many civil wars and intracommunal violence, political stability,
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fragile economies, poverty and underdevelopment, weak and collapsing states, and
environmental problems facing the sub-region. (Francis 2001)
In terms of the population flow within the West African Region, we have seen

that ECOWAS has attempted to create a free movement zone through signing different
protocols in 1979 and 1986. However, the effectiveness of these protocols has been
impeded by various factors discussed earlier. It is ironic that the most notorious
population movement within West Africa is a forced population movement. Thousands
of people are forced to seek refuge into their neighboring states in order to escape
mutilation and death. The UN refugee agency, for instance, reported that some 36,000
lvorian refugees had fled to Liberia. Guinea, because it shares borders with the three
major conflict areas of West Africa (Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Cote d'Ivoire) has hosted
more refugees than any other country in Africa for much of the past decade. Its number
of refugees is estimated to 400,000 refugees. This is the sad but real picture of
population mobility in West Africa. This type of mobility in return causes instability and
disorder in the host country. Guinea for this reason is on the brink of war.
While any variables that have been taken into account, in the course of this study,
could lend themselves to alternate explanations, the most significant determinant of
ECOWAS' failure to become a factor of integration in West Africa seems to be the
divide between Anglophone I Francophone leadership. This quarrel of leadership
between the Anglophone side and the Francophone side of the organization has
specifically undermined the capabilities of ECOWAS to successfully intervene in
Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Cote d'Ivoire. The failure, which is political
and military in nature, has had pernicious effects on the economic integration of West
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Africa in the sense that integration in West Africa is dependent upon the security of the
region.
Onwuka argues that the French-speaking West African leaders, through a series of
treaties of co-operation with metropolitan France, and the formation of such
organizations as OCAM, Conseil de !'Entente and many others showed to cohere under
virtual French leadership. He maintains that the solidarity among the French West
African states has helped to widen the barrier between French and English-speaking areas
in the region (Onwuka 1982). Some authors have argued that this attitude is dictated by
an attempt from the Francophone leadership to counter Nigeria's hegemony. Adibe, for
instance, notes that the fact that Nigeria is perceived as an hegemonic threat by her
francophone neighbors constitutes impediment to the success of ECOWAS (Adibe 1997).
On this account, the fact that six Anglophone and one Francophone West Africa
countries, Ghana, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, The Gambia, Liberia and Guinea (the historical
outsider of the Francophone zone) are hoping to use a single currency by 2003 is not
good news for the integration of West Africa. This may result in an "ossification" of the
pernicious divide between the two rival camps of the region. Its ramifications in terms of
ECOWAS' incapacity to face the challenges of integration will only become extensive
Lastly, for any serious integration to be envisaged, the leaders ECOWAS have to
demonstrate a genuine willingness to bridge the Anglophone/ Francophone divide, to
cooperate and build a better regional transport networks and communication systems. In
a region spread across more than 6,800,000 square km, only a modern transportation
system will guarantee a fluid flow of persons and good from one state to the next.
Ezenwe (1983) stressed, twenty years ago, the need for an effective transport system and
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the need to adapt West Africa's postcolonial institutional heritage to the new political
realities in order to meet national needs and aspirations in the context of ECOWAS. This
remark is still valid today. What is desperately needed in Africa is also needed in West
Africa: to institutionalize the mechanism of conflict resolution (Adebajo 2002,
Huntington 1968). From these perspectives, it is clear that, judged by the objectives that
the founders of ECOWAS set up in its creation which is to promote co-operation and
integration and to establish of an economic union in West Africa in order to raise the
living standards of its peoples, and to maintain and enhance economic stability through a
secure West Africa, ECOWAS has failed. Today, West Africa is neither more secure nor
more integrated than it was prior to the creation of ECOWAS. However, Kalu (1995)
argues that ECOWAS states and their leaders have the potential if they act collectively
and decisively in cooperative efforts to diversify their economies and engage in
technological development and manufacturing, trading among themselves and also in
resolving conflicts within the region.
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Table ill- Nigeria (Imports)
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3.5

9 Brazil

273

3.2

265

3.1

Total Imports

1
Singapore

0
Source: IMF Direction of Trade, DTI/ES Statistics, available at
http://www.tradepartners.gov. uk/nigeria/profile/03 economic/economic.shtml (April 22, 2003)
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Table IV - Sierra Leone (Exports)

38.9
7.4
7.4
;oermany

6.7

[Japan

4.8

'South Africa

Total
Sierra Leone -IMF Direction of Trade, available at
http://www.tradepartners.gov.uk/text/sierra leone/profile/03 economic/economic.shtml (April 23, 2003)

Table V - Sierra Leone (Imports)

:World Imports into Sierra Leone

US$ Millions

!UK

23

1Netherlands

9.4

.USA

7.3
5.6
5.2

4.2
4.0
3.8
Nigeria
Total
Sierra Leone-IMF Direction of Trade, available at
http://www.tradepartners.gov.uk/text/sierra leone/profile/03 economic/economic.shtml (April 23, 2003)

1.8
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Table VI - ECOW AS & East Africa: a Comparative Table
East African Countries - GDP per capita

ECOWAS - GDP per capita

Comoro Island

238

Benin

373

Djibouti

873

Burkina Faso

185

Eritrea

191

Cape Verde

1,297

99

Cote d'Ivoire

573

Kenya

301

Gambia, The

312

Madagascar

150

Ghana

258

Malawi

150

Guinea

380

Guinea-Bissau

196

Liberia

176

Mali

223

Ethiopia

Mauritius

4,194

Mozambique

282

Seychelles Isl.

7,453

Somalia

140

Mauritania

322

Tanzania

268

Niger

167

Uganda

257

Nigeria

319

Senegal

462

Sierra Leone

133

Togo

283

Source: Nations of the World: A Political, Economic, and Business Handbook 2003
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Chapter3
Political Leadership and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)

When on June 26, 2002, four African Presidents met with the leaders of the eight
major industrialized democracies at Kananaskis, Canada, to discuss an initiative by the
African leaders to get Africa out of poverty, most commentators drew immediately a
parallel between the just born plan and another one of its kind that saved Europe after the
devastation of Second World War. The plan that African leaders came to discuss with
the G8 is known as the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) which is a
merger of the Omega Plan by the Senegalese President, Abdoulaye Wade, and The
Millennium African Recovery Plan by President Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, President
Olusogun Obasango of Nigeria, President Abdel Aziz Bouteflika of Algeria. Like the
Marshall Plan, NEPAD is an attempt to save a devastated continent. But there, the
similarity ends. If the Marshall plan was meant to reconstruct the different parts of the
European engine destroyed by World War II, NEPAD is a creation of Africa's new
leadership and is meant to build the engine from scratch.
A cursory look at contemporary African history shows a series of assistance plans
that started from the birth of the African nations in the 60s and went on to this date with
variations in times and places. Jeffrey Herbst (1992, 1) notes that since 1980, the
international community has committed a total of $27 billion to Africa in aid. The major
donors are the former colonial masters of the African continent (France, Great Britain,
Germany) and the US. Whatever their aim might have been, these aid programs share a
common denominator: failure. These aid programs failed mainly because, as external
solutions to African problems, they were systematically infused into Africa without any
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precise and organized control on the part of the African countries. NEPAD, on the
contrary, is a partnership for the development of Africa. Its originality lies in the fact
that it is not a handout. It is a pledge by African Leaders to the people of Africa to
promote sound economic management, democracy, peace, security and development.
For the first time in the history of the black continent, leaders came up with a clear and
defined plan to save Africa. What they are asking for is no less than the financing of a
project that they intend to implement. This time, they do not intend to sit at the side and
watch some pundits or experts from the World Bank or International Monetary Funds do
the job for them. They want to do it themselves and bear the responsibility to the future
generations (Africa News 2003). In this respect, NEPAD constitutes a major
development in the history of African Politics and as such deserve a more acute attention.
This chapter seeks to examine how NEPAD was created and its implications for
Africa. In doing so, I intend to focus on Africa's leadership in the process. This analysis
is both timely and crucial. Timely, in the sense that it deals with an organization that has
been around for barely a year now. Crucial, seen that the destiny of the black continent
could be linked to the success or failure of this plan. In this chapter, I intend to test the
literature review with a focus on the New Partnership for Africa's Development. The
material will be gathered mainly from newspaper articles, official statements, and the
website of the organization. Unlike the previous chapter, which had a regional focus, I
propose to start with a brief continental description of the African background.
Understanding this background is essential for any understanding of the physical and
psychological background under which this leadership operates.
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I. The African Context
Judged by any parameters of economic and political development, the black
continent lags behind by a far and ever increasing margin. What explains this fact?
Answers are numerous and complementary. They are the combinations of external and
internal factors. The external factors could be mainly attributed to three centuries of
slavery, one century of colonization, and another century of neocolonialism (Walter
Rodney 1981). The internal factors are mainly constituted by the lack of political will of
African leaders. My argument here is that while we may have no control over the past,
the future is what African leaders make of it. For this reason this chapter will be devoted
to examining the internal conditions in Africa.
A major variable to look at is the political one. While the overall political
situation in Africa could be legitimately given a poor grade, it is nonetheless noteworthy
to mention that some mixed progress is being made (van de Walle 2002, Young 1996).
For instance, since the end of the Cold War, at least 11 countries have seen the peaceful
transfer of power to opposition rivals following multi-party elections (Government of
Canada 2002).
The political variable aside, all others receive a failing grade. By economic
standards, the black continent is by far the poorest region of the planet. Out of its
807,419,000 people, over 340 million people live on less than a dollar per day. Africa is
the only continent where poverty is on the rise. In terms of international trade, Africa
accounts for less than 1% of global investment flows, while an estimated 40% of Africa's
own private savings are invested outside of Africa (Government of Canada 2002).
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The black continent is also the most indebted of all continents. Thirty-three of the
region's 44 countries are designated heavily indebted poor countries by the World Bank;
most of the rest nearly qualify for that ranking (IMF/World Bank 2002). The burden of
this debt today swings unjustly like a Damocles swords over the heads of innocent people
who have never seen the benefits of the reckless loans that the IMF delivered mainly to
the dictators of the seventies. This debt amounts today to approximately $200 billion and
is now equivalent to over 100% of Africa's gross national product (Meilink 2003).
As for the health balance sheet of Africa, it is simply a horror. Life expectancy in
Sub-Saharan Africa is the lowest of the world (47 on average). Millions of children die
in Africa every year due to acute respiratory infections, malaria, diarrhea, measles and
neonatal tetanus. In most of the cases, the real cause is malnutrition. Next to this, the
prevalence rate of HIVI AIDS is higher in Africa than anywhere else. Africa accounts for
70% of the global population of people infect with HIV/AIDS (5). As far as agriculture
is concerned, Africa's share of world agricultural trade fell from 8% in 1965 to 3% in
1996. The rate of illiteracy is on the rise. Enrollment trends since the Jomtien
Conference in 1990 indicate that in 2015 Africa will account for 15 percent of the
world's primary school-age children, but 75 per cent of children not in school (SAPA
NEWS Agency 2002). As for the digital divide, the number of telephone mainlines is
only 14 per 1000 people and there are 8 personal computers per 1000 people. There are
more internet connections in New York City than on the entire African continent
(Government of Canada 2002).
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II. How NEPAD was created

What accounts for this catastrophe in a continent that is home to the world's
greatest natural reservoirs? As suggested in the literature review of this thesis, it is
usually argued that the leadership failed to deliver. For the most part, political leadership
has emerged in Africa only to serve itself, not the people. This leadership, since
independence governed without vision. In most cases they are viewed as political
geniuses whose talents are only geared toward power preservation at the expense of
political and economic development (Londregan, Bienen, and van de Walle. 1995).
However, the survival of these leaders could be attributed to the context of the cold war
where major western countries, in order to thwart the advance of communism,
systematically poured money on entrenched dictators like Mobutu Seseko in Zaire, Siad
Barre in Somalia, and Gaafar Numeri in Sudan (Herbst 1992,11). The collapse of the
Soviet bloc in 1989, however, sounded to both the African leadership and the masses like
a resounding reminder that African problems would call for an African solution. The
post Cold War atmosphere became fertile for stock taking and awareness on the part of
the leadership of Africa. Movements were being formed to create adequate "think-tanks"
for an African recovery program. In May 1990, in Uganda, a movement was born under
the leadership of Obasango. This movement known as the Kampala Movement proposed
an organization that could allow the continent to free itself from dependency on the rest
of the world. This organization, the Conference on Security, Stability, Development, and
Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) meant to be an African solution to the African problem
and intended to succeed where the Organization of African Unity (OAU) failed.
Following the same drive, and with similar aims, Africa's new leadership at the GS
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summit in June 2002, presented the world with a plan to save Africa: The New
Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). NEPAD was born out of the merging
of two major plans: the Millennium Africa Recovery Plan (MAP) by South African
president Thabo Mbeki, Algerian president Abdel Aziz Bouteflica, and Nigerian
president Olusegun Obasago, and the Omega plan by Senegalese president Abdoulaye
Wade (Le Soleil 2002). The MAP is deeply rooted in Mbeki's favorite theme: the need
for an African Renaissance. It is an expression of the will of Africans to extricate
themselves and the continent from the malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in the
context of the irreversible process of globalization. In this respect, the plan seeks to
reposition the continent in terms of global economic relations. Like The MAP, the
Omega plan was conceived by Wade to bring an African solution to the African plight.
The Omega plan laid the emphasis on infrastructure, agriculture, education, and health,
and the need for the developed nations to contribute to their financing. The main
contention of the Senegalese president on this account is that infrastructures in Africa,
like Airports, practical roads are equally, useful to Africa as they are the industrialized
world. As these two plans were becoming increasingly influential and accessible to
scrutiny, their similarities and eventually their complementary nature came to light.
Through a difficult, and testing process, leaders from both sides finally accepted to
consider merging their two plans into a wider one; one that would draw from the
strengths of both. Thus, on July 3, 2001, the amalgamation between these two plans was
formalized into a new entity: the New African Initiative (NAI). NAI was approved by
the OAU Summit Heads of State and Governments in Lusaka on July 11, 2001 and
endorsed by leaders of GS countries on July 20. Its policy framework was finalized on
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October 23, forming NEPAD. Thus NEPAD was born out of the necessity to correct the
shot and to alleviate the suffering of the black continent on a wider scale (Kaunda 2003).

III. The Originality of NEPAD
Soon after NEP AD was launched, analysts from all corners of the world shiftily
draw a parallel between this plan and one that sprang from a similar context to uplift
Europe out of the Chaos of Post World War II. That plan was concocted from the U.S by
the then American Secretary of State George C. Marshall and proposed during his
Harvard Speech of June 5, 1947. The Marshall Plan was a calculated effort by the United
States that sought to tackle the crucial problems of "hunger, homelessness, sickness,
unemployment, and political restlessness" that were ravaging 270 million people in
sixteen nations in West Europe. This program cost the American taxpayers
$11,820,700,000 (plus $1,505,100,000 in loans that were repaid) over four years (George
C. Marshall Foundation 2002).
In what measures is this new African initiative an African version of the Marshall

Plan? At first look, this parallelism looks justified. The African continent of the
beginning of 21st displays some striking similarities with post World War II Western
Europe. Both entities are war ruined; both entities lack so much in terms of basic needs.
This could explain why on the local level as well as on the global one, different moves
were being made by African leaders in favor of an "African Marshall Plan. Outstanding
personalities, like Reverend Desmond Tutu, sought to lobby the U.S. Congress for a
"Marshall Plan for South Africa" (Tutu 2000). South African President Thabo Mbeki,
himself, used the World Economic Forum meeting in Davos to promote a homegrown
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African "Marshall Plan" (Mbeki 2001). Equally interesting, in the aftermath of the
Davos conference (February 2001), as well as that of Kananaski (June 2002), both
African and international media evoked the move that African leaders were making in
terms of a Marshall Plan for Africa. However, a closer look at some other key variables
reveals a fundamental difference between the two. First, the fact that the Marshall Plan
was conceived from outside Europe constitutes a major difference. If the Marshall plan
was an American solution the European problems, NEPAD proposes a solution to
Africa's trials in an African way. Second, and most fundamentally, if the Marshall Plan
was meant to reconstruct the destroyed parts of the European Engine, NEP AD has to
build the engine from scratch. In the European context, the capitalist machine was
already working and became rooted in the everyday life of the people. The machine was
simply interrupted by the war. The main reason why the Marshall plan worked is
because it was aimed at aiding a well-educated, industrialized people temporarily down
but not out. (Boyle 2001) In the case of Africa, a bewildering illiteracy rate and a
permanent state of violence from the 60s (birth of most African states) to this date makes
the case for a unique situation. In this sense, NEPAD is more ambitious and more
difficult to materialize than the Marshall Plan. Unlike the Marshall plan, which was
unilaterally financed the US, NEPAD's financing will come from the broader source of
the GS.

IV. Africa's New Leaders
"We march into the new era of the African century as Africans who have made
the determination that this century will be a hundred years in which we cease to be
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victims of our circumstances but victors. Through our own actions we will ensure that
poverty gives way to prosperity." (Mbeki 2001) This extract from Thabo Mbeki's speech
at the South African Parliament in February 2001 sums up in a rather eloquent manner
the magnitude of the new reality that African leaders, for better or for worse, will not
escape. In the 1990s a combination of the collapse of the communist bloc and the Baule
summit in France in June 1990 ushered the black continent into a new era that led to
awareness among African leaders.
Who are these new leaders? It might be interesting to proceed to a short
presentation of the four African leaders that played key roles to bring about NEPAD:
Thabo Mbeki (South Africa), Olusegun Obasango (Nigeria), Abdel Aziz Bouteflika
(Algeria) and Abdoulaye Wade (Senegal).
Thabo M. Mbeki is often introduced as the champion of the concept of "African
Renaissance" (Christen 1999). Through this concept, he dreams of creating a new Africa
in which poverty and oppression will be ended. Mbeki participated in the struggle to rid
South Africa of the plague of Apartheid. His story is intertwined with the story of South
Africa, which is one of injustice and domination of a majority by a minority on the basis
of race. It is both an irony and an indication of his passion for justice that the champion
of NEPAD, liberal is essence, joined the Communist Party of South Africa in order to
combat the Apartheid regime. His activism, since primary school, led to his ultimate
exile first in Britain and then in Moscow before his return to South Africa to succeed the
African pride, Nelson Mandela at the head of the Africa National Congress and as
President of South Africa.
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As for Olusegun Obasanjo, he is a relentless crusader for the dignity of the
African people. He served as president in the late 1970's. He voluntarily relinquished
power in 1979 to a civilian government that was later overthrown by the military.
Obasanjo spent three years in prison for the criticizing military regime of Sani Abasha.
One of his major contributions to Africa is undoubtedly the Conference on Security,
Stability, Development, and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) under the framework of
the Africa Leadership Forum (Deng and Zartman 2002). Inspired by the strategic
withdrawal of major Western powers, Obasanjo became increasingly aware, in order to
ensure its survival, in the pitiless world economy Africa would have to depend primarily
on itself. In this direction, he inspired scholars and political leaders from across Africa to
meet and design a cure to the African problem. These scholars and political leaders met
four times between November 1990 and May 1991. The last and main meeting resulted
in what is known as the Kampala Movement; it also produced a vision for Africa
captured by the Kampala document (Deng, Zartman 2002).
Abdel Aziz Bouteflika's life, like Mbeki and Obasango, has been one of constant
struggle. He fought against the French occupier in the National Liberation Army. He is
considered to be moderate in his politics, with a political orientation that lies in the
middle between socialism and capitalism. His faith in the unity of African countries were
instrumental his acceptance to preside over the Organization of African Unity in 1999
(Casteran 1999). As the leader of a country with one of the greatest potentials in Africa,
his conscience to be part of a greater ensemble has been crucial to his action towards a
united continent. Algeria almost has it all from natural gas and petroleum, to iron ore,
phosphates, lead, zinc, mercury, silver, salt, antimony, and copper.
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Abdoulaye Wade, for his part, has a passion for a unified Africa. Affectionately
called "Gorgui" (the man in Wolof), his life has been a constant struggle against mal
governance. His political beliefs in Africa, expressed in his book, Un Destin pour
L 'Afrique, gave him a political come-back every time he was considered politically dead.

He toppled the Socialist regime at age 74. His victory and the telephone call from the
incumbent president Abdou Diouf propelled Senegal to the restricted court of world
democracies. Soon after he got elected, he submitted to Africa what he believes could
save the continent: the Omega Plan with a noted emphasis on infrastructure building.
The confluence of leaders of this caliber is determinant to the creation of an
"African Initiative" and ultimately to the birth NEPAD. First and foremost, NEPAD is
meant to be a locomotive to drag Africa out its plight and tell the world that Africa means
business. In this, it is a new vision. The G8 (the eight most industrialized countries in
the world) had this in mind when they publicly supported this new African Initiative at
the Kananaski summit in Canada in June 2001.

V. NEPAD: a New Vision
NEPAD is a revolutionary program in many respects. It is truism to say that this
homegrown project is an authentic African initiative ratified by African leaders. It is a
clear vision in which Africans themselves set the agenda and decide what the priorities
are and what the process should be. They are in charge. NEPAD is different from all the
previous partnership programs that linked the African continent to its former colonial
master on one hand and to the U.S., Canada and other emerging powers on the other
hand. From the sixties onward the north-south rapport have been paternalistic in nature.
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The relationship consisted of orders from the developed word and execution from Africa
with heavy assistance. In the 1990s, the developed world, through the World Bank and
the IMF, systematically infused loans to the African continent, and systematically
dictated the policies with total disregard to the realities of the continent. Such a policy,
led analysts, scholars, and politicians in Africa and around the world to question whether
the institutions of Bretton Woods are really development-driven. For instance, Joseph E.
Stiglitz, an economics professor at Columbia University, and Nobel prize of economics,
contends that the IMF and the World Bank imposes upon the third world its own will
based on dry statistics drawn from central banks and finance ministries by their experts
who never get out of the four star hotels of the capital cities of the third world countries
(Stiglitz 2002). This attitude, he maintains, as demonstrated in the case of Ethiopia does
not serve the economies of the third world. Salih Booker, executive director of Africa
Action, for instance, maintains that these institutions must be made accountable for their
role in causing the worst health crisis in human history, which Africa now faces (Lobe
2002). All analysts agree today that the structural adjustment programs that the World
Bank and the IMF imposed on a defenseless Africa helped disrupted and already
decadent economic tissue (Logie and Woodroffe 1993).
NEPAD seeks to break decisively with this way of doing business. African
leaders realize that Africa cannot take off without loans from the most fortunate
countries. Yet, they are aware that it is in the best interest of Africa that the West serves
only as a jump-starter for the African economies. The job has to be done by them.
What's in essence this New Partnership? The New Partnership for Africa's
Development, as the name suggests, intends to be a genuine partnership between Africa
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and the Developed world on African terms. It is a total partnership at the national,
bilateral, multilateral, sub-regional, and regional level as well as a partnership at the
international level with the rest of the world. It is a program of the African Union (AU)
and pervades all aspects of life. Through a clear vision, African leaders have assessed the
needs of the continent and established an agenda to follow. They intend to do so,
following a rigorous methodological approach. They intend to start by bridging the
infrastructure gap that divide Africa to the rest of the world. Aware of the fact that the
road to economic development fares through the development of roads. For this reason,
the infrastructures considered include roads, highways, airports, seaports, railways,
waterways, and telecommunications facilities (NEPAD 2002). Private foreign finance is
necessary for the achievement of this titanic project. African leaders have recognized that
the resources required to finance development in Africa will not come from aid alone they must come from increased productivity, investment and trade. NEPAD, in this
sense, is a new partnership with Africa based on mutual responsibility and benefits.
Practical infrastructures would play a decisive role in the productivity of Africa. Most of
the existing infrastructures were built by the colonial masters and are specifically
designed to facilitate the transportation of raw materials from Africa and to transit
manufactured goods the other way around. In the new development-driven context, the
emphasis is laid on cooperation within the continent. African leaders are also aware that
no economic development is viable without peace, security, stability, and cooperation.
For this reason they are determined to tackle vigorously these questions. In this sense,
NEPAD is a commitment of African leaders to the peoples of Africa and the rest of the
world to put Africa on the path of sustainable development. On this account, it is an
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encouraging sign that some African businesses are already showing the way. NNCP and
Sonatrac Algeria have signed an agreement on a Trans-Saharan pipeline to link Nigeria,
Algeria, and Europe. The total funds involved are estimated at $7 billion (NEPAD
2002). But this enthusiasm should not distract from the challenges ahead that NEPAD
has to pick up.

VI. The Test of NEPAD
Can Africa halve poverty by 2015?-This question, posed by the 2000 UN
special assembly, will constitute a defining challenge to the New Partnership for Africa's
Development. The initiative is expected to address issues like: "a reduction by half of the
proportion of Africans living in absolute poverty; an increase in the enrollment of
children of school going age; the reduction of infant mortality levels by two thirds; the
improvement of access to reproductive health facilities and services, the elimination of all
dimensions of gender inequality side by side with the empowerment of women; and
improvement in the information technology profile of the continent; reversal of the brain
drain; increased investment in the human resources of the African continent." (Short
2002).
Like its predecessors, NEPAD will inevitably face challenges that will seal its
fate. The first of its challenges is the context and the environment in which it evolves.
The size of most African countries, the unpredictable nature of the wars in Africa, the
debt problem, the health problem, the digital divide gap, the brain drain issue, mal
governance, only to mention these. It would be hardly exaggerated to state that in Africa,
basically everything is a problem and for this reason, NEPAD's survival as a credible
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program will depend on its ability to surmount this multitude of hurdles. While, it's out
of the scope of this chapter, to study this myriad of problems on a separate basis, I
propose to consider the most relevant ones in relation to the topic.
The war variable is a major challenge that African leaders will have to face if any
foundation for sustainable development is to be laid on the black continent. Africa is a
continent at war, not with an external enemy, but at war with itself. Governments are
being toppled by extra legal means, people are being displaced by the thousands,
economies are falling apart, anarchy is being the rule in many areas of the continent. The
concept of a "Somalization" of Africa refers to the sad picture of an Africa of failed
states. In this context, surmounting her internal conflicts is one of Africa's top priorities
on the way to political development and economic integration. In this respect, it is
remarkable that the concepts of peace, security, and stability occupy a central place in
NEPAD. Wars do make of Africa a risk-prone area for investors. On this account,
NEPAD's war against poverty is first and foremost a war against war itself.
Next to this problem, the size of the bulk of African countries makes it extremely
difficult for any economic plan to function viably. Countries like Djibouti, Rwanda,
Burundi, Lesotho, Swaziland, The Gambia, Senegal, etc. do not have any real chance of
competing in a global economy. The size of these markets works toward an increasing
marginalization of the African economies since they do not constitute a major attraction
for private capital. In a 1961 memo by the Policy Planning Council, African experts
noted that the extremely small size of many African countries foreclosed the possibility
of any real autonomous domestic economic development. Should these countries try to
industrialize, they argue, scarce resources will tend to be misdirected into parallel and
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overlapping investments; and the possibilities of attracting private capital from abroad
will be reduced. (Herbst 1992) This remark holds true today.
Other critics have often focused on NEPAD's neoliberal leanings, which in their
view does not correspond to Africa's historic and cultural realities. They contend that
NEPAD is inspired by the international Monetary Fund-World Bank strategies of
Structural Adjustment Programs, trade liberalization that continues to subject Africa to an
unequal exchange between its exports and its imports, and structures on governance
borrowed from the practices of Western countries and not rooted in the culture and
history of the peoples of Africa. These critics point to NEPAD's neo-liberal framework
and its disregard for earlier African initiatives such as the Lagos Plan of Action of 1980
and the Alternative to Structural Adjustment Programs, which were rejected by the
Western powers (Turray 2002). In the same direction, the debt problem also constitutes a
bloc on the way of NEPAD that will have to be removed in order to give the continent a
fresh start. This is all the more legitimate since the bulk of this debt was contracted
following the logic of the cold war in which it profited the "dictator club" of Africa and
not the people.
Fundamentally, how NEPAD is going to deal with mal-governance and the
entrenched dictators still in Africa will define the partnership for better or for worse. In
this direction a special eye should be directed to the peer review program contained
within NEPAD. The most vocal critics ofNEPAD argue that the problem with African
initiatives is not their brilliance. Most of them are just shiny, but they fail at the level of
implementation. In other words, NEPAD, like its predecessors may tum out to be a
"tiger without tooth" (Melber 2002). For this reason, many influential newspapers on the
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African continent contend that NEPAD might not work. (Tandon 2002) On this account,
however, it is encouraging that, in theory, an agreement has being signed to outlaw the
rulers that would not conform to the basic rules of democratic governance. The
challenge, however, would be to see how far they are willing to go to make good
governance a reality in Africa.
On the other hand, NEPAD, in order to be effective, has to tum an open ear to the
grassroots and civic society. Good governance cannot solely be the business of the
leadership; it cannot even only be the reserved domain of ruling and opposing parties,
developed as they may be. Democratic governance, in essence, calls for a critical
discourse, a dissenting voice from actors outside the political party boundaries. These
healing voices should be allowed to come from all aspects of social life. One of
NEPAD's biggest challenges lies in its ability to allow a third voice and also to sacrifice
the tacit "African brotherhood" in favor of an uncompromising transparency. On this
account, NEPAD's endorsement of the flawed election in Congo-Brazzaville,
Madagascar, Zambia and Zimbabwe, despite some dissident voices within itself,
constitutes a shot that needs to be corrected. The effectiveness of the African Peer
Review Mechanism (APRM) under NEPAD's "Democracy and Political Governance
Initiative" (DPGI), both essential components of NEPAD, in this case, will be a defining
parameter of the new programs acceptance by Africans. NEPAD's success will require a
very strong commitment to reform from Africa's leadership, and a real partnership from
the industrialized countries to support that effort. The price tag of $64 billion a year to
meet commitments outlined in NEPAD requires something of a trial. One could be
wondering, however, if NEPAD has an alternative in store in case the projected finance
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does not come forth. In this respect the profound disagreement between some prominent
African leaders and some potential donors countries about the elections in Zimbabwe
serves a test of what the future may be made of.
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Chapter4
Political Leadership, the African Union and the Quest for Unity in Africa:
What Explains the Creation of the African Union?

It is often argued that the fall of the Berlin Wall opened a new era in international

politics. The same is true for African politics. The symbolic event of November 9, 1989
in the capital city of Germany, indeed, ushered African politics into a new era. This era
corresponded to the great wave of democratization. The collapse of the Soviet bloc and
the triumph of liberal democracy set the flame for a reverberating democratization
movement on the black continent. It has been a period of change and challenge to the
whole black continent. But, more than anything else it has been a test of political
leadership. The Baule summit in France in June 1990, which tied economic aid to
democratic transitions, constituted both a logical and an additional impact on this process
in a significant manner. These external factors were coupled by feigned and somehow
real efforts to democracy on the part of the African leadership. About a decade later,
Africa's new leadership has successfully led to the creation of the African Union at the
Durban Summit on July 8, 2002. The Durban summit was an expression of unity for the
black continent. The Union was perceived as a guarantee of economic integration, but
most importantly, the birth of the Union meant a concern for political stability and good
governance via a genuine democratization process in Africa.
The idea of a Union, however, goes back to the early days of African
independence. When Ghana became the first Sub-Saharan African country to free itself
from British yoke in 1958, its leader, Kwame Nkrumah, took a strong stand for the
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liberation of all of Africa and expressed the idea of a continental government. This
tradition of leadership favored the idea of one-Africa and was also nurtured by leaders
such as Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, with his dream of a rehabilitation of the historic
pre-colonial African communities, and Patrice Lumumba of the Congo-Kinshasha, the
"prophet of the transcontinental society and a unitary state", as well as Julius Nyerere of
Tanzania, and Haile Selassie of Ethiopia. The same ideal was revived by modern African
leaders in the caliber of Muammar Khaddafi of Lybia, Thabo Mbeki of South Africa,
Olusegun Obasango of Nigeria, Abdel Aziz Bouteflika of Algeria, Abdoulaye Wade of
Senegal, to name but a few. The birth of the African Union on 8 July 2002 at the Durban
summit in South Africa was incontestably the direct product of informed leadership. The
idea of the union, a coalition of 53 states was first emitted in official terms during the
Syrte summit in Libya in September 1999 when Khaddafi proposed a United States of
Africa. Support for his idea was overwhelming during the 37th OAU summit in July
2001 at Lusaka, Zambia. Support for the Union was also apparent in UN Secretary
General's "tribute to leader [Khaddafi] for spearheading this development" (Annan 2001)
Who is Khaddafi? What are his motivations? Why did Mbeki, Obansanjo,
Bouteflika and Wade, the champions of good governance and democratic principles
follow Khaddafi who does not share their basic philosophies of government? Most
amazingly how was it possible that the G8, a coalition of the world's leading
democracies, accepted to back a project launched by a leader who, by their standards, is
nothing more than a ruthless dictator and an international outcast? How did the African
Union become a reality? What are the policy implications and recommendations? This
chapter intends to shed a light on these different questions. The fact that no academic
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research has been geared toward this issue makes it both interesting and challenging, and
ultimately rewarding. Most fundamentally, a genuine understanding of how the African
Union was created, and its implications, is crucial for the future of the black continent.
For all these underlined reasons, I decided to take on the subject of political leadership,
the AU and the quest for unity in Africa with a special interest in the factors that made
the creation of the Union a possibility.

I. The African Union's Precursor: the OAU
On July 8, 2002, 40 African heads of states and governments met at Durban,
South Africa with the agenda to bury the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and
deliver the African Union. What went wrong with the Organization of African Unity?
What would be fundamentally different with the AU? How did the new African
leadership get to the point where they felt the AU to be a necessity? These are the main
questions I intend to test in this section of the chapter.
The OAU was created on May 25th, 1963 in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia) in a time of
need for Africa's total independence. The OAU was created to free the continent of
colonial rule and to promote the Unity of the African continent. However, the Addis
Ababa meeting was finally possible after enormous compromises between the Casablanca
faction and the Monrovia faction. The first one was composed of Ghana, Guinea, Mali,
Egypt, Algeria, and Morocco and the second one known as the Monrovia group was
essentially made of Nigeria, Liberia, Senegal, Ivory Coast, Cameroon, and Togo. More
than anything else, the Addis Ababa summit was a shock of leadership and personalities.
It was Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana against the majority of African Leaders. Nkrumah,
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whose well-timed manuscript "Africa Must Unite" was already circulating among the
delegates at the summit wanted nothing sort of a genuine United Africa. His idea of
unity embedded the concepts of a common citizenship, a common currency, and a
common defense system all necessary components for the security and stability of Africa
(Nkrumah 1963). Opposition to his views was carried out, in its most noticeable form. by
Houphouet Boigny of Ivory Coast, Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, Philibert Tsiranana of
Malagasy. "I should underline" declared Tsiranna, "that our adhesion means by the same
token a rejection of a formula for a Federation of African States because federation
presupposes the surrender of a large part of national sovereignty" (Olisanwuche 1994,
194). This statement of rejections of Nkrumah's ideas is symptomatic of the general
feeling at the conference. The factionalism in Africa's leadership translated into the
acceptation of the colonial frontiers of Africa. The organization whose name had been
suggested by Hubert Maga of Dahomey thus sowed ironically the seeds of dislocation,
not of unity. Yet, the OAU should be credited for its invaluable contributions to the
decolonization process. The liberation of Zimbawe, Mozambique and Guinea Bissau.
was possible to a large extent because of the OAU's support. Ridding South Africa of
Apartheid constitutes, in part, a credit to the continental organization. At the level of
uniting these countries, however, the OAU's record is a dismal failure. The present
condition of Africa is a witness to this fact.
Makumi Mwagiru of the Institute of Diplomacy and International Studies at the
University of Nairobi, Kenya, for instance, points to Article 3(2) of the OAU Charter as
an indication of a crisis which is ruining of OAU and especially its Conflict Management
mechanism (Mwagiru 2003). The OAU, by laying a strong emphasis on the principle of
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non-intervention in the affairs of another state, through article 3(2), constitutes by itself a
hindrance to conflict resolution in Africa. Rwanda with 800,000 Tutsis and antigovernment Hutus hutus killed constitutes a case of resounding failure of the continental
organization. While most analysts agree that the direct cause of the genocide was the
incitement of the country's Hutu majority against the Tutsi minority by a small group
among the Rwandan governing class, there is little doubt that "this terrible conspiracy
only succeeded because certain actors external to Rwanda allowed it to go ahead" (The
Perspective 2003). The OAU also failed to be a peace broker in the Ethiopia-Eritrea
border disputes just in the same way as it failed to prevent the senseless massacre and
maiming of innocent civilians in Sierra Leone and Liberia. The OAU, many scholars
argue, became a club where dictators and weak democrats met to talk with no political
will to address Africa's urging needs. CNN European Political Editor Robin Oakley, for
instance, referred to the OAU as a talking shop. It has done little to boost Africa's
economies or combat the scourge of AIDS and other infectious diseases. (Oakley 2001)

II. The Creation of the AU
Although the idea of the African Union idea goes back to the independence days
of Africa, it was rekindled at the Syrte Summit in September 1999, when Libya's
charismatic leader Muammar Khaddafi, launched the idea of a United States of Africa in
place of the Organization of African Unity. Who is Khaddafi? What does the African
Union mean? Why are his motivations for launching this project? What are the
conditions, internal and external that dictated the creation of the AU? What other major
development in World Politics made the creation of the AU a sine qua non condition for
the survival of Africa? This section will peruse these questions. Africa's leadership,
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following the call of one leader, agreed to a Union in order to save Africa. Who are these
leaders and most definitely who is Khaddafi?

Khaddafi

Khaddafi is without a doubt one of the most captivating leaders of twenty-first
century Africa. He came to power in a time of great need for liberation. Libya had
experienced over three decades of Italian colonial rule from 1912 until World War II,
when the U.S-U.K attacks swept the Italian and German presence out of North Africa.
After the war, Libya was granted independence, with King Idris installed as a compliant
regent with a demonstrated propensity to take orders from the U.S. and Britain. The U.S.
maintained a huge Air Force base near Tripoli, the Libyan capital, with the British
holding on to their military barracks at Azizia. Khaddafi' s overthrow of King Idris in a
bloodless revolutionary act intended to restore the independence of Lybia. He started by
nationalizing the oil companies and drove the foreign bases away from its soil. Wheelus
Air Force Base, a major American military installation located on the Mediterranean Sea
just east of Tripoli, was shut down.
His confrontation against what he calls "the western enemy" would make him an
international pariah. His alleged involvement in international terrorism worsened Libya's
isolation. The alleged involvement of two Libyans in the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103,
which exploded over Lockerbie, Scotland, on Dec. 21, 1988, killing all 271 on board
triggered a series of international sanctions on Lybia. These events did set off a pitiless
campaign of international isolation of Lybia and its leader. His quarantine became
unbearable after the rejection of the Arab World. After, condoning the mantle of Gamal
Abdel Nasser, Gaddafi's efforts to promote a Pan-Arab front were met with a cold
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reception in the Arab World in 1998. In this sense, Khaddafi became the epitome of a
marginalized continent in desperate need for a united front. Thus, shunned "by the West,
held at arm's length by his Arab neighbors, Colonel [Khaddafi] has been reduced to
courting African leaders in a effort to gain the international recognition he craves"
(Dynes 2002, 1) From this perspective, one could legitimately contend, without ruling out
his genuine passion for a United Africa, that Khaddafi's decision to launch the idea at this
point in time had something to do with a desire for international recognition. The
champions of the New Partnership for Africa's development (NEPAD), also in search of
an African solution to the African problem, would join Khaddafi in this endeavor. The
new leaders had previously merged two rival plans to give birth to the New African
Initiative, which in tum became NEPAD. NEPAD is the result of the fusion between the
Millennium Africa Recovery Plan (MAP) by Thabo Mbeki of South Africa, Olusegun
Obasanjo of Nigeria and Abdel A. Bouteflika of Algeria, and the Omega Plan by
Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal. NEP AD constitutes an essential, if not the most essential
component of the AU. So to answer the question: why did Africa's leadership follow
Khaddafi in his proposal to destroy the AOU and replace it with the AU, one must
consider a various set of variables. The first one is the African context: one of abject
poverty, diseases, and wars. Second, Khaddafi's proposal came at a time when other
leaders in Africa, fed up with the OAU, were already working on alternative solutions.
The lingering question, however, is how could these three champions of good governance
have followed Khaddafi. The answer lies in "realpolitik". In the context of Africa, the
Union should foster democracy and not make of democracy an entrance prerequisite.
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Should democratic governance be a condition, one could realistically ask how many
countries would be eligible for membership.

III. The Battle for Leadership in the AU
The creation of the African Union, among other things, has unveiled a fierce
battle of leadership. Mbeki himself admits the existence of competition in the leadership
of the Union (Xinha News Agency 2002). Each of the architects of the Union has done
what they possibly could to win the leadership of the black continent. But most
remarkably, the battle has opposed two leaders: Khaddafi of Lybia and Mbeki of South
Africa. The two most powerful men in Africa are waging parallel battles for the soul of
the continent. Their duel is conducted in public, in conferences and in meeting rooms
across the continent (Sunday Times 2002). They constitute two different styles. The first
one is very strong on ideology and is imbued with a historical sense of a conflict between
the developed and the underdeveloped world. As for Mbeki, he has been painted very
often as a pragmatic leader. For one thing, each of them undoubtedly nourishes a deep
conviction that unity is the only way out for the poorest continent on earth. But they
disagree on the methods, the procedures and ultimately, the meaning of unity. Mbeki is
an advocate of cooperation between the different states of Africa and between Africa and
the world. Khaddafi wants to settle for nothing less than a single federal entity for Africa
with one president and one army. This may explain why Mbeki is opposed to Khaddafi's
dream for a single state across Africa just in the same way as he rules out support for an
African federal army (SAPA News Agency 2002). Mbeki believes in the immediate
democratization of the whole continent, and leans more towards capitalism. Whereas
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Khaddafi is an advocate of the "third way" which is somewhere in between capitalism
and socialism. He contends that power lies in the people, and that parties do represent
partisanship and division, and therefore undermines the power of the people. For this
reason, he does not allow parties in Libya and rules in an autocratic manner. Michael
Dynes contends that "In contrast to the vision of an Africa made up of democratic
governments that respect the rule of law and human rights, as championed by Thabo
Mbeki, the South African President, Colonel [Khaddafi] has been campaigning for the
creation of a United States of Africa in which he would in effect be crowned Emperor of
Africa." (Dynes 2002) Other newspapers abound in the same direction. The
Independent evokes Khaddafi's ambitions to "hijack" the African Union by using his
country's oil wealth to buy influence across Africa (Peta 2002). Africa is indeed the
continent of extremes, and these two leaders represent two clear caricatures of these
differences.
In their race for continental leadership Mbeki has found allies in Africa's
"democratic leaders", whereas, Khaddafi appeals most to the other dictators of the
continent and other leaders with their own understanding of the concept of democracy.
The strategies used to secure their alliances reveal differences in personality. Mbeki' s
demarche is an appeal to reason, and the intellect, as in his Millennium Africa's Recovery
Plan, and NEPAD, which lays in a logical way his intentions for the African continent.
Khaddafi on the other hand is endowed with a natural intuitive gift and a rare intelligence
to exploit circumstances in his favor. He seduces African leaders with his liberal gifts
and Libyan oil money (Sunday Times 2002). Khaddafi's strategy to win the leadership
contest also includes paying off the arrears of six African countries, enabling them to
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regain voting powers in the OAU, after they were suspended for non-payment of
subscriptions (Butcher 2002). In terms of development strategies, Khaddafi argues in
favor of African countries pooling their natural and financial resources and build the
economies of the continent from within. As for Mbeki, he argues that presently, Africa
simply does not have the capital and technological resources to make the best use of its
vast natural assets, and compete in the global economy. This explains Mbeki's leanings
towards the G8 in order to secure the necessary capital for a kick-start of the economies
of Africa.
Ultimately, Khaddafi's efforts to host the launching of the AU in Sirte, Lybia so
that he could become the chairman was aborted so is he likely to lose his bid to host the
Parliament of the African Union (Peta 2003). Mbeki won the chairmanship of the Union.
However, the fact that Amara Essy, who sees Khaddafi as his ticket for a prolonged stay
as the AU's General Secretary, was chosen for the job could be indicative of a status quo.
In fact Essy's loyalty to Khaddafi is a proven fact. For him, the "culmination, or rather,
this new phase, owes a lot, ... , to the personal efforts and total commitment of one man,
who was completely imbued with the vision of a strong, interdependent and dignified
Africa". (Sunday Times 2002, 2) He makes no mystery about the man he is referring to.
Khaddafi lost in his bid to host the first AU summit in his country, but he undoubtedly
succeeded in stealing the show from Mbeki at the Durban summit in South Africa. The
reports are impressive and the splendor of his journey to Durban is reminiscent of Mansa
Moussa, the emperor of Mali in his Pilgrimage to Mecca in 1324. The Libyan leader
landed on Saturday in dramatic style, accompanied by his signature fleet of aircraft,
reportedly carrying 60 vehicles - and two camel. He was swathed in flowing brown
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robes and a finely hand-embroidered gold kente cloth from Ghana as he flew into
Durban. (PanAfrica 2002). The same source indicates that on the following day he
invited heads of state and miniters to a banquet at his temporary residence, an act usually
reserved to the host country. The Durban summit, the "Biggest Show in Town"
(PanAfrica 2002, 1) ranks high certainly among Africa's most theatrical expression of
leadership contest in the history of the black continent. This battle was most dramatically
captured by "live television pictures beamed from the official opening [showing]
Gaddafi's rotund chief bodyguard wrestling with beefy South African police as he tried to
force himself into the meeting"(The Financial Gazette 2002).
One thing, however, remains clear: the shape of Africa in the future will owe a lot
to the duel between these two styles. Ultimately, the two styles can be complementary in
some aspects. Mbeki's diplomatic aptitudes to get an attentive ear among the leaders of
the developed world could be completed by Khaddafi' s grassroots approach. Even if
Khaddafi rules like an utter dictator, by western standards, Libya is not on the spotlight
for human rights violations as is the rule in many African countries (Sunday Times 2002.
For one thing, the Durban conference will go down in history as one of Africa's most
remarkable leadership duel.

IV. The International Urgings and the creation of the AU
The fall of the Berlin wall constitutes a founding-event in the evolution of world
politics. It also marked a turning point in African politics. During the Cold War,
Western and Soviet strategic interest in Africa was a sufficient cause for support for
African regimes regardless of their nature. But with the changes in world politics at the
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end of the Cold War, it became increasingly clear that Africa needed a change to cope
with a new era and new challenges. In this new era, political development and economic
integration gets on top of the agenda. The OAU, created to promote political solidarity,
was not able to pick up the democratic or economic integration challenge. For this
reason, the African Union was created with the primary purpose of promoting political
development and economic integration and guarantee the continent a decent place in the
global economy. It was created out of the necessity for African leaders to take into their
own hands the destiny of the African continent. First and foremost, the Union is a pledge
that the people of Africa will be released from the grip of under-development, poverty,
ignorance and diseases (Mantu 2002).
How was it possible for the African Union, an idea launched by a known
detractor of the democratic model of governance and an "international outcast" to get the
backing of the Champion of good governance and even the 08, the world's major 8
democracies. This fact, in itself, expresses all the complexities of international politics
and obeys the logic of realism in international relations. My contention is that the
champions of good governance joined in the proposal of Khaddafi as a result of a cost
benefits analysis and "realpolitik". The African Union, in a purely African context, is
marriage of convenience not of love. By joining with Khaddafi, Mbeki, Obasanjo,
Bouteflika, and Wade were seeking venues to make Nepad a more effective tool, as the
AU would mean greater market opportunities. Otherwise, how is it comprehensible that
these leaders would join Khaddafi whose blasts at NEPAD as an instrument of Western
domination in the hands of African puppets is common knowledge. During his
improvised speech, in response to Mbeki at the Durban summit, he lashed out: "If they
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(the West) want to impose on us conditions, we refuse that ... " (Sunday Times 2002, 2)
The African Union's decision to retrieve the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM)
from the AU could be read as a measure to accommodate Khaddafi. The APRM is a
device, comprised within NEP AD, aimed at promoting democratic principles of
government. As for the G8, I contend that their support for this African initiative is a
means to secure international security. The invocation of moral obligations may just be a
self-satisfying device. Helping the African continent cope with the disasters of poverty
and HIVI Aids may be one of the best ways to prevent world contagion. Their backing of
the AU, however, was made easier by the presence in the AU of the defenders of
democratic principles (Mbeki, Obasanjo, Bouteflika and Wade). To ensure support from
the West, the latter did not manage their efforts to get more involved in the formation of
the AU and to try to "steer [the] Union out of [Khaddafi] clutches" (Gumede 2001) One
is also forced to recognize that Khaddafi' s efforts to project a new image constituted a
facilitating factor in these new developments. On this account, his acceptance to hand
over his son in-law for judgment and conviction over the Lockerbie tragedy may
constitute an explanation factor to a certain degree. In addition, the Sunday Times (a
South Africa Newspaper) underscores that Libya is not known for any glaring human
rights violation and that Libyans have access to free housing, education, health care,
water and electricity (Sunday Times 2002).
At the end of the day, foreign support is needed to make the most out of the
potentials of the continent but the essential part will have to be performed by Africa's
leadership. This is certainly what Amara Essy, Secretary General of the African Union
means when he argues that external support is essential, but development is an internal

73

affair (PanAfrica 2002). In this respect, the African Union was born out of a relentless
effort to put the African house in order and to meet the challenges of the 21st century.

V. A World of Big Groupings
The world is increasingly becoming the reserved domain of big ensembles. The
classic argument is that if the European powers feel the urge to create a Union through
the EU and the American hemisphere through the North American Trade Agreement, the
African continent is not left with a wide range of choices but to unite. The African Union
is a pure product of Africa's leadership in search for a remedy to the African drama. It
was created to ensure Africa a place in the changing international arena. It is a message
from the new generation of African leaders to their people and to the international
community that they want to close the pages of the past and open a new era; an era in
which the world will reckon with Africa. This new leadership intends to be the master of
its own house. At the economic level, the AU is, to a large extent, a pact between
Africa's new leadership and the wealthy nations, in which international investment is
traded for good governance, fiscal responsibility and respect for human rights (Parkinson
2002).
Soon after African leaders gathered at Durban to bury the 39-year-old OAU and
deliver the African Union, news around the world and even in Africa referred to the event
in relation to the European Union. How accurate is this comparison? To what extent was
Africa's leadership taking cue from Europe? Interestingly enough, Khaddafi, himself,
admits that he borrowed heavily from the structural blueprints of the European Economic
Union. In fact, he selected from the EU' s economic model, aspects he thought could be

74

applied to Africa and added much of his own (Nevin 2001). To a large extent, the AU
was consciously modeled on the European Union. Like the European organization, the
AU plans to have a continental parliament, a common market, a single currency and a
court of human rights. Its is also true that, like the European Union, the African Union
has sought to include a socioeconomic development program covering its member states.
This program is both inseparable and part of the global organization that is the AU. Other
similarities lie in the way these two organizations function. Like the European Union, the
executive of the AU is no longer vested in a Secretariat General, as was the case with the
OAU, its predecessor, but in a President of the Commission of the African Union (Bourgi
2002). But do these similarities make the African Union a European Union biz? The
facts seem to militate against an abusive parallelism between these two organizations.
It is indeed true that, like the European Union, the African Union was created in
order to drive Africa into the future with a sense of confidence, vision and purpose. But
the African union both in the way it was created and in the way it functions contains
elements, which make it a clearly distinctive creation and an original vision. The gradual
process that the European Union took to come into existence is contrasted by the
"spontaneous" way in which the African Union became a reality from the Syrte Summit
of September 1999 to the Durban Summit of July 2002. The EU took nearly fifty years
to form and it did not start by including every European country. As for the AU, it was
much like a call by a leader, Khaddafi, answered with the sudden and spontaneous
reaction of the rest of Africa's leadership. It included all 53 African countries as
members from the onset. This unique situation makes the question whether there should
be standards, such as democracy and good governance for joining the AU like in the EU,
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a daunting one. Equally, the African Union, in view of the economic position of the
continent, can't afford to make of economic standards a condition for entering the Union.
How many countries would meet the minimum standard? Can the African Union afford,
for that matter, to grant loans to poorer members? These questions are indicative of a
continent that is suffering from an internal dilemma. How to be inclusive and yet rest on
some fundamental principles necessary for the preservation of the Union. The following
extract from Thabo Mbeki's letter to Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chretien should be
understood within such a context. "As Africans, like any other people in the world,"
argued Mbeki, "we have the capacity to determine what is in our best interest, the
determination to promote this interest to the best of our ability, and the resolve honestly
to confront any tendency that is inimical to the advancement of these interests." (Mbeki
2002).

VI. Summary of the Chapter
This chapter has argued that in order to understand why the African Union was
created, one needs to take a look at some key variables namely, the leadership variable,
the leverage variable in relation to NEPAD, and developments on the international scene
as expressed in the European Union and NAFf A who constitute both models and reasons
urging for an African Union. Ultimately, my findings do suggest that the African Union
was created mainly for reasons of realpolitik. It was realism that dictated Africa's
leadership's endorsement of Khaddafi's idea, in spite of seemingly insurmountable
differences. It was the same logic that dictated the G8' s backing of the project. This
wave of support was made possible by calculations on the part of the champions of
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Nepad, especially Mbeki, that they could ultimately "steer [the] Union out of Gaddafi's
clutches" (Gumede 2001). In sum, the fact that African leaders, despite these essential
differences, were able to find a common platform is dictated by their overwhelming
awareness that collective action is needed in order to curve the spiral of poverty and that
of countless diseases, one of which is the aids pandemics. Thus each of these leaders had
their own national agendas, yet they were able to beyond these considerations in order to
posit a common purpose.
I also contend that the creation of the African Union is a decisive but not
sufficient step towards economic integration and political stability in Africa. This union,
however, with its economic, political and security sections could well constitute the basis
on which a genuine united Africa may be built. While I recognize that the AU is not
immune of legitimate criticism, I contend that its idea bears hope for political stability in
the black continent. It could play a significant role in the democratization process based
on African realities, the resolution of the endless conflicts across the continent, and the
promotion economic and social development. The Organization of African Unity was
buried on 8 July 2002 and replaced by the African Union precisely because the former
rapidly became a "club of dictators" incapable of delivering on its promises of economic
integration and political and social development. And this is precisely where the African
Union may have to amend itself if it is to endure. At its current stage and specifically, the
dispositions in Article III of the constitutive act of the AU which, is related to the
sacrosanct nature of the colonial frontiers, the African Union calls for an amendment. In
other words, the African Union should become a process, not a self-satisfying end in
itself. This is probably one meaning to be given to UN Secretary General Koffi Annan's
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warning. "Let's us not imagine that, once proclaimed," he hammered, "our Union will
become a reality without further effort" (Nevin 2002). This warning is a degree of
measurement to the task ahead, which promises not to be an easy one.
If nothing else, one thing is clear; the journey from dislocation to unity will call
for the synchronized energies all the children of Africa, from all wakes of life. The
grandeur of Africa's leadership will lie in its willingness and ability to catalyze this
tremendous amount of input. As Amara Essy, the Secretary General of the AU, puts it "it
is not the texts that will make [the] African Union, it is the human beings - the men and
women who believe in this African Union, who make the African Union (Essy 2002, 3).
This is where the future African parliament will fit in. On this account, the drafters of the
constitution of the Union showed a remarkable sense of history in ranking this parliament
as one of the major organs that will drive the worlds' second largest inter-national bloc.
Once again, whether this organization will be able deliver, as a genuine voice of the
people will depend less on what the text says than on two other major factors. The first
one is the kind of room for maneuver that the top leadership will be willing to make for
the "direct representatives" of the continent. But, second and most importantly, it will
depend on the willingness and the capacity of the latter to play their historic share.
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Chapters
Conclusion

In this thesis, I have examined the role of African political leadership in the quest
for unity and development in Africa. I examined the previous literature on the related
subject in order to test it. And, because of the new developments that this study seeks to
analyze, data has also be collected from newspaper articles, official, government
statements, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. This in itself
may constitute one of the weaknesses of this thesis. In choosing to deal with two
organizations that are still the making, NEPAD and the AU, both of them barely a year
old, I was aware that I was shooting at a moving target. Further research may be in a
more comfortable situation of studying these developments in retrospect. I also focused
on a study of individual leaders through the complexities of their interactions. One of the
lessons of history is that exceptional circumstances do call for exceptional leaders. In the
case of Africa, this may be true. My findings suggest that this is true in the way the three
integration organizations were created by Africa's leadership, especially in the case of
NEPAD and the AU. However, my findings are also in keeping with the literature I
examined (Gordon 2002, Ayittey 2000, Konneh 2002, Adewoye 2000, Muchie 2002) in
the sense that Africa's leadership, as the main factor for the disintegration and
degeneracy of Africa, is still a constant.
I started with a study of the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS). This has revealed a variety of findings. First ECOWAS has not translated
into West Africa's leadership's ability to promote greater integration in West Africa as
shown by the leadership's inability to promote trade within West Africa. Most
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remarkably, the failure of the leadership is also evidenced by its incapacity not only to
secure a united West Africa, but by its incapacity to secure peace within the Sub-Region.
Sierra Leone and Liberia are living testimonies to this fact. On this account, one could
point, with a bit of disappointment, for instance, that a single sentence, "In order for there
to be peace and stability in Liberia, Charles Taylor needs to leave now" (Wilson 2003) by
President Bush may be having more impact than the 14 years old monologue of Africa's
leadership under the auspices of ECOWAS.
My second chapter examined the New Partnership for Africa's Development
(NEP AD). Unlike ECOWAS, NEP AD was born at the conjuncture between four major
African leaders belonging to different regions of the continent but who have in common
their concern for the principle of good governance. Its creation was dictated by Africa's
leadership, and both the African context and the international context. Its originality lies
in the fact that Africans are the sole architects of this program that intends to be an
African cure to Africa's problems. However, like the previous plans that were meant to
save Africa, NEPAD will inevitably face some defining tests. A case in point, if not the
most significant so far, is the Zimbabwean example. Zimbabwe, with it recent election
masquerade, provided the young program with a failing test to its peer review
mechanism, an essential component of NEPAD. The African Peer Review Mechanism
(APRM), despite the Zimbabwean faux pas, will to a great extent define NEPAD's
future. Whether NEPAD will go down in the annals of history in positive and
memorable terms or not will largely depends on the success or failure of the Peer Review
Mechanism. While it may not be fair to posit Zimbabwe as a make-or-break try-out test
for NEPAD, it is certainly true that it is a case in point. As Professor John Strelau, head
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of the international relations and co-director of the Center of Africa's International
Relations at the University of Witwatersrand, puts it "Zimbabwe provides a limus test for
NEPAD ideal (Melber 2002). In addition, NEP AD should not become an end by itself,
but rather a means towards a genuine united Africa. This is certainly what African
leaders understood when they decided to make of NEPAD an essential, if not the most
essential element of the African Union (AU).
Like NEPAD, the African Union is a creation of Africa's leadership as a response
to Africa's problems and also as a means to secure Africa a descent place in an
increasingly globalized world. My findings suggest that despite serious philosophical and
political differences between its founders, necessity was a key factor to why the African
Union became a reality. It was the same realism that dictated the GS support for both
NEPAD and the African Union. NEPAD and the African Union, I argue can succeed
where subregional organization, like ECOW AS failed. In order for this to happen, they
should be a means to a greater end and not an end by themselves. The greater end is a
genuine continental unity for Africa. This unity can only be guaranteed by an
uncompromising rejection of the colonial borders. The current borders of Africa do not
correspond to any African cultural realities, nor do they correspond to any historic
realities and are the source of division, not of unity. Real economic development, in the
case of Africa, could only be guaranteed by a single political unit and a single economic
unit, that only a federation of Africa could guarantee. This remark is all the more
legitimate since in Africa the question of national identity is becoming a growing source
of discord. A genuine federation based on the rejection of the colonial borders could
guarantee the end of nationality wars on the black continent. These wars are fought on
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the basis of a desire to have an exclusive control over a given artificial territory. The
OAU failed to question these borders and became a club of dictators.

This policy

recommendation, however, goes beyond my findings in its formulation of the remedy for
Africa's problems. My conviction is that neither the continental nor the regional
organizations have worked so far largely because Africa's leadership failed to establish
the right institutions. A major lesson from perusing into the different insights of the
above scholarship is that the drastic nature of Africa's problems calls for a radical and
unequivocal solution. This type of uncompromising solution in turn calls for a leadership
with courage and determination. It will take what Edmund Burke calls trustees not just
delegates. It will take a leadership that is willing to make the necessary steps to promote
a genuine united front regardless of mere political calculations. This fundamentally
begins with the questioning of the current borders of Africa, which do not correspond to
any African reality. For the good of the African continent, real and pragmatic actions
should take precedence over wishful thinking. On this account, If Mbeki' s proposition of
an establishment of a court of justice, through which despots, tyrants and warlords would
be brought before a tribunal, tried and, if found guilty, sentenced, becomes a reality, good
governance would mark a decisive win. Unfortunately, the Constitutive Act and the
various conventions that the African Union has inherited from the Organization of
African Unity may contain the very seeds that defeated the purpose of the buried
organization of African Unity. For this reason, the latest move by President Mbeki and
his confirmation that NEPAD's African Peer Review Mechanism will not review the
political governance of African countries, even if it seeks to accommodate dictators in
Africa, is not good news for the continent (Chiahemen 2002).
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Ultimately, the defining challenge for the African Union, the worlds' second
largest inter-national bloc will be that of leadership and genuine political will to make the
Union work. If poor leadership played a key role in the devastation of a once beautiful
continent, the new leadership has the awesome and historic responsibility to absolve the
"sins of the fathers". During the African Union's annual summit in Mozambique on July
10, 2003, UN secretary General Kofi Annan, an African citizen, had a pertinent remark.
"The U.N and the rest of the international community", he told African heads of states,
"can appoint envoys, urge negotiations and spend billions of dollars on peacekeeping
missions, but none of this will solve conflicts, if the political will and capacity do not
exist here, in Africa" (Annan 2003).
There is no doubt that history has not been a fairy tale for Africa. Slavery and
colonialism degraded and exploited the continent, and left behind a bitter legacy;
neocolonialism, the cold war, and poor leadership finished the damage. This history still
reverberates in Africa today. But it is also true that the leadership has failed Africa.
Today, the challenge for Africa's leadership is to escape from the grips of the past and
create the conditions that will allow the people of Africa a life of dignity. And there has
never been a better opportunity to do so. These are the challenges of modem days; these
are the defining challenges of political leadership. The battle for political and economic
emancipation could only be won with a mind resolutely turned towards the future. When
African leaders met at Kananaski in June 2002 and at Durban in July of the same year,
that is what they were signing: a pledge to the people of Africa to promote sound
economic management, democracy, peace, security and development within the
framework of a united Africa. At the end of the day, this exciting road to unity and
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development promises not to be an easy one. More than anything else, it promises to be a
test of leadership.
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